Samy Bengio, Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow
3 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/1607.02533.json · badge: /api/ran/1607.02533.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| niazarak/adversarial-attack | reimplementation (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
3 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| clip | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
niazarak/adversarial-attack/adversarial.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("62ca13b288fb7f80") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, niazarak/adversarial-attack when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| train_adv_examples | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
niazarak/adversarial-attack/adversarial.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("255735430fc0631b") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, niazarak/adversarial-attack when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| train_adv_fgsm | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
niazarak/adversarial-attack/adversarial.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("35828f5ef17691fd") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, niazarak/adversarial-attack when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Most existing machine learning classifiers are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is a sample of input data which has been modified very slightly in a way that is intended to cause a machine learning classifier to misclassify it. In many cases, these modifications can be so subtle that a human observer does not even notice the modification at all, yet the classifier still makes a mistake. Adversarial examples pose security concerns because they could be used to perform an attack on machine learning systems, even if the adversary has no access to the underlying model. Up to now, all previous work has assumed a threat model in which the adversary can feed data directly into the machine learning classifier. This is not always the case for systems operating in the physical world, for example those which are using signals from cameras and other sensors as input. This paper shows that even in such physical world scenarios, machine learning systems are vulnerable to adversarial examples. We demonstrate this by feeding adversarial images obtained from a cell-phone camera to an ImageNet Inception classifier and measuring the classification accuracy of the system. We find that a large fraction of adversarial examples are classified incorrectly even when perceived through the camera.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("1607.02533")
get_code_for_paper("1607.02533")
have("1607.02533")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/1607.02533.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/1607.02533)
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