Nicholas Carlini, David Wagner
12 of 13 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 9 have no contract verdict; 2 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/1608.04644.json · badge: /api/ran/1608.04644.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| carlini/nn_robust_attacks | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| PerryXDeng/adversarial_mnist_attacks | community (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
6 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| kkew3/pytorch-cw2 | community (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
2 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Bhushan-Jagtap-2013/Adversarial_Attack_on_RNN | extension (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| zetongqi/attacking_neural_networks | reimplementation (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| jfc43/pixel-discretization | community (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| activation | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
PerryXDeng/adversarial_mnist_attacks/neural_network.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("cc16b0d5bc15bb67") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (3, 2) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| cross_entropy | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
PerryXDeng/adversarial_mnist_attacks/neural_network.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("39df9d693fbdc4de") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned float32, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| denormalize | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
PerryXDeng/adversarial_mnist_attacks/data_preparation.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6c0b9095663ceff6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 3, dtype family int, shape (2, 2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| generate_data | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Bhushan-Jagtap-2013/Adversarial_Attack_on_RNN/test_attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ae7a589f65750d71") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| generate_data | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
carlini/nn_robust_attacks/test_attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("33c3e5273c448151") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_cuda_state | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
kkew3/pytorch-cw2/runutils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ab527cad8796ffd2") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned bool, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_image | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
zetongqi/attacking_neural_networks/CW_l2attack.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("0cb12596aa3c0436") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, zetongqi/attacking_neural_networks when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| normalize | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
PerryXDeng/adversarial_mnist_attacks/data_preparation.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f33c321f1f8ee09c") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| predict | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
kkew3/pytorch-cw2/runutils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6189cef972a4615e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 1, dtype family int, shape (2,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| preprocess | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
jfc43/pixel-discretization/data-specific-discretization/ImageNet/util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("544bb80adbb9ade1") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 3, dtype family float, shape (2, 4, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| sigmoid | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
PerryXDeng/adversarial_mnist_attacks/neural_network.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("cf589faab9919534") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 1, dtype family float, shape (4,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| vectorized_label | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
PerryXDeng/adversarial_mnist_attacks/data_preparation.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("aca0af8d07cfa276") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (10, 1) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| make_cuda_consistent | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
kkew3/pytorch-cw2/runutils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9a04b87a21ee7dbd") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 13 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 13 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 12 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 11 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| generate_data | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
1604.08275 (2016-04) Crafting Adversarial Input Sequences for Recurrent Neural Networks |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Neural networks provide state-of-the-art results for most machine learning tasks. Unfortunately, neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples: given an input x and any target classification t, it is possible to find a new input x that is similar to x but classified as t. This makes it difficult to apply neural networks in security-critical areas. Defensive distillation is a recently proposed approach that can take an arbitrary neural network, and increase its robustness, reducing the success rate of current attacks' ability to find adversarial examples from 95% to 0.5%. In this paper, we demonstrate that defensive distillation does not significantly increase the robustness of neural networks by introducing three new attack algorithms that are successful on both distilled and undistilled neural networks with 100% probability. Our attacks are tailored to three distance metrics used previously in the literature, and when compared to previous adversarial example generation algorithms, our attacks are often much more effective (and never worse). Furthermore, we propose using high-confidence adversarial examples in a simple transferability test we show can also be used to break defensive distillation. We hope our attacks will be used as a benchmark in future defense attempts to create neural networks that resist adversarial examples.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("1608.04644")
get_code_for_paper("1608.04644")
have("1608.04644")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/1608.04644.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/1608.04644)
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