4 of 4 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 3 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/1905.09162.json · badge: /api/ran/1905.09162.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| ssloxford/biometric-backdoors | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
4 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| check_args | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
ssloxford/biometric-backdoors/face/adversarial/atk_face.py pointer only (licence: NOASSERTION) · get_code("1ad4d307fcb64cd3") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub could not classify the licence of this paper's repository, ssloxford/biometric-backdoors (NOASSERTION). The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| check_args | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
ssloxford/biometric-backdoors/face/adversarial/countermeasure.py pointer only (licence: NOASSERTION) · get_code("e67635f123338937") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub could not classify the licence of this paper's repository, ssloxford/biometric-backdoors (NOASSERTION). The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| load_glasses_stuff | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
ssloxford/biometric-backdoors/face/adversarial/countermeasure.py pointer only (licence: NOASSERTION) · get_code("be47cee03a7f0506") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub could not classify the licence of this paper's repository, ssloxford/biometric-backdoors (NOASSERTION). The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| load_pose_stuff | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
ssloxford/biometric-backdoors/face/adversarial/countermeasure.py pointer only (licence: NOASSERTION) · get_code("1b33611672884884") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub could not classify the licence of this paper's repository, ssloxford/biometric-backdoors (NOASSERTION). The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 4 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 4 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 4 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 4 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
In this work, we investigate the concept of biometric backdoors: a template poisoning attack on biometric systems that allows adversaries to stealthily and effortlessly impersonate users in the long-term by exploiting the template update procedure. We show that such attacks can be carried out even by attackers with physical limitations (no digital access to the sensor) and zero knowledge of training data (they know neither decision boundaries nor user template). Based on the adversaries' own templates, they craft several intermediate samples that incrementally bridge the distance between their own template and the legitimate user's. As these adversarial samples are added to the template, the attacker is eventually accepted alongside the legitimate user. To avoid detection, we design the attack to minimize the number of rejected samples. We design our method to cope with the weak assumptions for the attacker and we evaluate the effectiveness of this approach on state-of-the-art face recognition pipelines based on deep neural networks. We find that in scenarios where the deep network is known, adversaries can successfully carry out the attack over 70% of cases with less than ten injection attempts. Even in black-box scenarios, we find that exploiting the transferability of adversarial samples from surrogate models can lead to successful attacks in around 15% of cases. Finally, we design a poisoning detection technique that leverages the consistent directionality of template updates in feature space to discriminate between legitimate and malicious updates. We evaluate such a countermeasure with a set of intra-user variability factors which may present the same directionality characteristics, obtaining equal error rates for the detection between 7-14% and leading to over 99% of attacks being detected after only two sample injections.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("1905.09162")
get_code_for_paper("1905.09162")
have("1905.09162")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/1905.09162.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/1905.09162)
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