7 of 10 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 6 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/1908.00686.json · badge: /api/ran/1908.00686.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| TDteach/backdoor | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
7 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| Hbeta | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
TDteach/backdoor/tsne.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("77fb404ad78a22d9") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| build_base_model | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
TDteach/backdoor/pysrc/train_cifar10.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("874d05e9545938a1") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Functional. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| build_base_model | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
TDteach/backdoor/pysrc/train_gtsrb.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e15bd05849cc4332") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Functional. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| build_model | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
TDteach/backdoor/pysrc/train_gtsrb.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("45579f864dad8357") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Functional. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| options_to_json | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
TDteach/backdoor/pysrc/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5117993745c7bae0") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| pca | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
TDteach/backdoor/tsne.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f60cb3cead55f81b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (5, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| x2p | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
TDteach/backdoor/tsne.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("654e67f1bec03fc8") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (5, 5) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| parse_record | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
TDteach/backdoor/pysrc/train_cifar10.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("4e8aeb9bb95b5b61") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| split_model | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
TDteach/backdoor/pysrc/train_cifar10.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a756332b6091f3b8") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| split_model | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
TDteach/backdoor/pysrc/train_gtsrb.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("69b6b3cbe737eaf2") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 10 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 10 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 9 distinct functions with an identity, 9 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (3 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 9 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hbeta | 3 other papers 1 dated earlier, 2 later |
1606.02185 (2016-06) Towards a Neural Statistician |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense 2510.07746 (2025-10) t-SNE Exaggerates Clusters, Provably |
| pca | 2 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 later |
1606.02185 (2016-06) Towards a Neural Statistician |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
| x2p | 2 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 later |
1606.02185 (2016-06) Towards a Neural Statistician |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
| build_base_model | 1 other paper 1 later |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
|
| build_base_model | 1 other paper 1 later |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
|
| build_model | 1 other paper 1 later |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
|
| options_to_json | 1 other paper 1 later |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
|
| parse_record | 1 other paper 1 later |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
|
| split_model | 1 other paper 1 later |
2310.00542 (2023-10) Watch Out! Simple Horizontal Class Backdoor Can Trivially Evade Defense |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
A security threat to deep neural networks (DNN) is backdoor contamination, in which an adversary poisons the training data of a target model to inject a Trojan so that images carrying a specific trigger will always be classified into a specific label. Prior research on this problem assumes the dominance of the trigger in an image's representation, which causes any image with the trigger to be recognized as a member in the target class. Such a trigger also exhibits unique features in the representation space and can therefore be easily separated from legitimate images. Our research, however, shows that simple target contamination can cause the representation of an attack image to be less distinguishable from that of legitimate ones, thereby evading existing defenses against the backdoor infection. In our research, we show that such a contamination attack actually subtly changes the representation distribution for the target class, which can be captured by a statistic analysis. More specifically, we leverage an EM algorithm to decompose an image into its identity part (e.g., person, traffic sign) and variation part within a class (e.g., lighting, poses). Then we analyze the distribution in each class, identifying those more likely to be characterized by a mixture model resulted from adding attack samples to the legitimate image pool. Our research shows that this new technique effectively detects data contamination attacks, including the new one we propose, and is also robust against the evasion attempts made by a knowledgeable adversary.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("1908.00686")
get_code_for_paper("1908.00686")
have("1908.00686")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/1908.00686.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/1908.00686)
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