We lifted 2 functions out of this paper's own repositories and ran 0 of them in a sandbox. "Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| abojchevski/graph_cert | canonical | 0 of 2 |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| policy_iteration | Not yet run | abojchevski/graph_cert/graph_cert/certify.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3438a101fa992299") |
| upper_bounds_max_ppr_target | Not yet run | abojchevski/graph_cert/graph_cert/certify.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b7c3c82aff6faf0a") |
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Despite the exploding interest in graph neural networks there has been little effort to verify and improve their robustness. This is even more alarming given recent findings showing that they are extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks on both the graph structure and the node attributes. We propose the first method for verifying certifiable (non-)robustness to graph perturbations for a general class of models that includes graph neural networks and label/feature propagation. By exploiting connections to PageRank and Markov decision processes our certificates can be efficiently (and under many threat models exactly) computed. Furthermore, we investigate robust training procedures that increase the number of certifiably robust nodes while maintaining or improving the clean predictive accuracy.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("1910.14356")
get_code_for_paper("1910.14356")
have("1910.14356")
Connect an agent — have() is free.