We lifted 16 functions out of this paper's own repositories and ran 11 of them in a sandbox. "Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd | canonical | 11 of 16 |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| analyse_mi_results | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/run_mi_attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("fe9612fdf18b362f") |
| compute_additional_noise | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/noise_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("26de49e46eb9bd78") |
| compute_gaussian_noise | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/noise_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7d426b2ef7951163") |
| compute_wu_bound_strong | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/noise_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e24eb576415f7535") |
| get_classifier | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/attacks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a8aefe19dea792d8") |
| get_dataset_size | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/experiment_metadata.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ebe56f1b69048664") |
| get_model_init_path | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/cfg_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3c737e63cc13a19a") |
| get_n_weights | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/experiment_metadata.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("503264e42be535d8") |
| get_threshold | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/attacks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8bce23044e7f4920") |
| min_max_rescale | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/data_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("649b482fe8ad62e8") |
| validation_split | Ran | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/data_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2c6c3a9b821d4b3a") |
| build_model | Not yet run | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/model_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("aa8df6e3e5373e58") |
| define_metric_functions | Not yet run | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/model_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ae0a33bbf1d9dc11") |
| get_mi_attack_accuracy | Not yet run | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/attacks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2658ac28c563e3a6") |
| load_cfg | Not yet run | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/cfg_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("af89613292776213") |
| load_model_at_time | Not yet run | microsoft/intrinsic-private-sgd/aDPSGD/model_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e922c575ce82dfaa") |
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Introducing noise in the training of machine learning systems is a powerful way to protect individual privacy via differential privacy guarantees, but comes at a cost to utility. This work looks at whether the inherent randomness of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) could contribute to privacy, effectively reducing the amount of \emph{additional} noise required to achieve a given privacy guarantee. We conduct a large-scale empirical study to examine this question. Training a grid of over 120,000 models across four datasets (tabular and images) on convex and non-convex objectives, we demonstrate that the random seed has a larger impact on model weights than any individual training example. We test the distribution over weights induced by the seed, finding that the simple convex case can be modelled with a multivariate Gaussian posterior, while neural networks exhibit multi-modal and non-Gaussian weight distributions. By casting convex SGD as a Gaussian mechanism, we then estimate an `intrinsic' data-dependent $ε_i(\mathcal{D})$, finding values as low as 6.3, dropping to 1.9 using empirical estimates. We use a membership inference attack to estimate $ε$ for non-convex SGD and demonstrate that hiding the random seed from the adversary results in a statistically significant reduction in attack performance, corresponding to a reduction in the effective $ε$. These results provide empirical evidence that SGD exhibits appreciable variability relative to its dataset sensitivity, and this `intrinsic noise' has the potential to be leveraged to improve the utility of privacy-preserving machine learning.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("1912.02919")
get_code_for_paper("1912.02919")
have("1912.02919")
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