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Paper · 2002.05463 · 2020

Identifying Audio Adversarial Examples via Anomalous Pattern Detection

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-21; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2002.05463.json · badge: /api/ran/2002.05463.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
IBM/adversarial-robustness-toolbox canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: census
1 ran · 0 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
shape_labels Ran
ran, violated the contract we drafted
IBM/adversarial-robustness-toolbox/art/attacks/poisoning/adversarial_embedding_attack.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("62ea3edf38aea545")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 1, dtype family int, shape (4,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import numpy as np

# Create test label arrays with different shapes
# Test case 1: shape with first dimension = 1 (will be squeezed)
lbl_1d = np.array([[1, 2, 3, 4]])  # shape (1, 4)

# Test case 2: shape with first dimension > 1 (will not be squeezed)
lbl_2d = np.array([[1, 2, 3, 4], [5, 6, 7, 8]])  # shape (2, 4)

ARGS = {
    "lbl": lbl_1d
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API
Imports
numpy — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type ndarray, ndim 1, dtype family int, shape (4,) — shape (4,) as a later run recorded it
dtype family
int means an integer dtype; float means any other dtype the instrument saw, bool and complex included (fixture_check.py records only these two families)
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block

Also present in other papers' code

Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

FunctionAlso present inEarliest-datedOthers named
shape_labels 1 other paper
1 later
2312.02798 (2023-12)
Weakly Supervised Detection of Hallucinations in LLM Activations

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-21.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Audio processing models based on deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks even when the adversarial audio waveform is 99.9% similar to a benign sample. Given the wide application of DNN-based audio recognition systems, detecting the presence of adversarial examples is of high practical relevance. By applying anomalous pattern detection techniques in the activation space of these models, we show that 2 of the recent and current state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on audio processing systems systematically lead to higher-than-expected activation at some subset of nodes and we can detect these with up to an AUC of 0.98 with no degradation in performance on benign samples.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

get_harvested_code_for_paper("2002.05463")
get_code_for_paper("2002.05463")
have("2002.05463")

The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:

curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2002.05463.json

A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):

[![Syntology run record](https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2002.05463.svg)](https://syntology.ai/paper/2002.05463)

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