6 of 7 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 5 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-21; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2003.03030.json · badge: /api/ran/2003.03030.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
6 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| addTrigger | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack/experiments/enhance_trigger.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("afde2fce23e904be") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| average_gradients | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8553e59eb6f6feab") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_data | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack/input_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2fba3fef686b0192") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_frames_data | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack/input_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8a9994123dd07cf9") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| sample_data | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack/input_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("19178582a4611840") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| tower_loss | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0be7f8fa62988f87") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned EagerTensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| placeholder_inputs | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ShihaoZhaoZSH/Video-Backdoor-Attack/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3a790fcc84f46286") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 7 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 7 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 7 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 6 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| average_gradients | 3 other papers 3 dated earlier |
1803.03764 (2018-03) Variance Networks: When Expectation Does Not Meet Your Expectations |
1805.01954 (2018-05) Behavioral Cloning from Observation 1807.09190 (2018-07) PReMVOS: Proposal-generation, Refinement and Merging for Video Object Segmentation |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-21.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks which can hide backdoor triggers in DNNs by poisoning training data. A backdoored model behaves normally on clean test images, yet consistently predicts a particular target class for any test examples that contain the trigger pattern. As such, backdoor attacks are hard to detect, and have raised severe security concerns in real-world applications. Thus far, backdoor research has mostly been conducted in the image domain with image classification models. In this paper, we show that existing image backdoor attacks are far less effective on videos, and outline 4 strict conditions where existing attacks are likely to fail: 1) scenarios with more input dimensions (eg. videos), 2) scenarios with high resolution, 3) scenarios with a large number of classes and few examples per class (a "sparse dataset"), and 4) attacks with access to correct labels (eg. clean-label attacks). We propose the use of a universal adversarial trigger as the backdoor trigger to attack video recognition models, a situation where backdoor attacks are likely to be challenged by the above 4 strict conditions. We show on benchmark video datasets that our proposed backdoor attack can manipulate state-of-the-art video models with high success rates by poisoning only a small proportion of training data (without changing the labels). We also show that our proposed backdoor attack is resistant to state-of-the-art backdoor defense/detection methods, and can even be applied to improve image backdoor attacks. Our proposed video backdoor attack not only serves as a strong baseline for improving the robustness of video models, but also provides a new perspective for more understanding more powerful backdoor attacks.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2003.03030")
get_code_for_paper("2003.03030")
have("2003.03030")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2003.03030.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2003.03030)
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