1 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2003.10595.json · badge: /api/ran/2003.10595.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| inspire-group/membership-inference-evaluation | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| risk_score_compute | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
inspire-group/membership-inference-evaluation/privacy_risk_score_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("81788b40d8707d75") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned ndarray, ndim 1, dtype family float, shape (4,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| calculate_risk_score | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
inspire-group/membership-inference-evaluation/privacy_risk_score_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("74e7e18e4a7173b3") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| distrs_compute | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
inspire-group/membership-inference-evaluation/privacy_risk_score_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3e6a99f5cb729ecc") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Machine learning models are prone to memorizing sensitive data, making them vulnerable to membership inference attacks in which an adversary aims to guess if an input sample was used to train the model. In this paper, we show that prior work on membership inference attacks may severely underestimate the privacy risks by relying solely on training custom neural network classifiers to perform attacks and focusing only on the aggregate results over data samples, such as the attack accuracy. To overcome these limitations, we first propose to benchmark membership inference privacy risks by improving existing non-neural network based inference attacks and proposing a new inference attack method based on a modification of prediction entropy. We also propose benchmarks for defense mechanisms by accounting for adaptive adversaries with knowledge of the defense and also accounting for the trade-off between model accuracy and privacy risks. Using our benchmark attacks, we demonstrate that existing defense approaches are not as effective as previously reported. Next, we introduce a new approach for fine-grained privacy analysis by formulating and deriving a new metric called the privacy risk score. Our privacy risk score metric measures an individual sample's likelihood of being a training member, which allows an adversary to identify samples with high privacy risks and perform attacks with high confidence. We experimentally validate the effectiveness of the privacy risk score and demonstrate that the distribution of privacy risk score across individual samples is heterogeneous. Finally, we perform an in-depth investigation for understanding why certain samples have high privacy risks, including correlations with model sensitivity, generalization error, and feature embeddings. Our work emphasizes the importance of a systematic and rigorous evaluation of privacy risks of machine learning models.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2003.10595")
get_code_for_paper("2003.10595")
have("2003.10595")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2003.10595.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2003.10595)
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