Graham Neubig, Paul Michel, Keita Kurita
5 of 5 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 4 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2004.06660.json · badge: /api/ran/2004.06660.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| neulab/RIPPLe | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
5 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| get_stats | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
neulab/RIPPLe/get_stats.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6bf281562340ed0f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_tasks | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
neulab/RIPPLe/download_glue_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d8d0c155d6eee8f3") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_words | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
neulab/RIPPLe/get_words.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5b1c58618252b512") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. It ran in syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps (sha256:6a292aa1aed1) at 2026-09-27T00:55:05Z. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| insert_word | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
neulab/RIPPLe/poison.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6de14dd0d528268c") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| prod | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
neulab/RIPPLe/constrained_poison.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("99f4817ce6cc133b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
Of 5 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 5 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 5 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 4 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| get_tasks | 13 other papers 6 dated earlier, 6 later, 1 same year, order not determinable |
1711.05225 (2017-11) CheXNet: Radiologist-Level Pneumonia Detection on Chest X-Rays with Deep Learning |
1804.07461 (2018-04) GLUE: A Multi-Task Benchmark and Analysis Platform for Natural Language Understanding 1810.04805 (2018-10) BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding and 10 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct "weight poisoning" attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose "backdoors" after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and finetuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/ neulab/RIPPLe.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2004.06660")
get_code_for_paper("2004.06660")
have("2004.06660")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2004.06660.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2004.06660)
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