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Paper · 2004.15015 · EMNLP · 2020

Imitation Attacks and Defenses for Black-box Machine Translation Systems

U Berkeley, Eric Wallace, Dawn Song, English Encoder, Mitchell Stern, German Decoder

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2004.15015.json · badge: /api/ran/2004.15015.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
Eric-Wallace/adversarial-mt marked official in Papers with Code
Papers with Code archive
1 ran · 0 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
get_loss_and_input_grad Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
Eric-Wallace/adversarial-mt/all_attack_utils.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a07d4edfacfa3b5f")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import torch
import torch.nn as nn

torch.manual_seed(0)

class MockModel(nn.Module):
    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        self.linear = nn.Linear(4, 4)
    
    def forward(self, net_input):
        return self.linear(net_input)

class MockOptimizer:
    def __init__(self, params):
        self.param_groups = [{'params': list(params)}]
    
    def backward(self, loss):
        loss.backward()
    
    def zero_grad(self):
        for group in self.param_groups:
            for param in group['params']:
                if param.grad is not None:
                    param.grad.zero_()

class MockCriterion(nn.Module):
    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
    
    def forward(self, model, sample, target_mask=None, reduce=True):
        net_input = sample['net_input']['src_tokens']
        output = model(net_input)
        loss = output.mean()
        return loss, None, None

class MockTrainer:
    def __init__(self):
        self.model = MockModel()
        self.criterion = MockCriterion()
        self.optimizer = MockOptimizer(self.model.parameters())
        self._seed = 0
    
    def _set_seed(self):
        torch.manual_seed(self._seed)
    
    def get_model(self):
        return self.model
    
    def zero_grad(self):
        self.optimizer.zero_grad()
    
    def _prepare_sample(self, samples):
        batch_size = 2
        src_len = 5
        src_tokens = torch.randn(batch_size, src_len, 4)
        src_lengths = torch.tensor([src_len, src_len - 1])
        return {
            'net_input': {
                'src_tokens': src_tokens,
                'src_lengths': src_lengths
            }
        }

trainer = MockTrainer()
samples = [
    {'id': 0, 'source': 'hello world'},
    {'id': 1, 'source': 'foo bar'}
]

ARGS = {
    'trainer': trainer,
    'samples': samples,
    'target_mask': None,
    'no_backwards': False,
    'reduce_loss': True
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1
Imports
torch — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type tuple — a tuple output has no array shape of its own; none is stated
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block

Also present in other papers' code

Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Adversaries may look to steal or attack blackbox NLP systems, either for financial gain or to exploit model errors. One setting of particular interest is machine translation (MT), where models have high commercial value and errors can be costly. We investigate possible exploitations of black-box MT systems and explore a preliminary defense against such threats. We first show that MT systems can be stolen by querying them with monolingual sentences and training models to imitate their outputs. Using simulated experiments, we demonstrate that MT model stealing is possible even when imitation models have different input data or architectures than their target models. Applying these ideas, we train imitation models that reach within 0.6 BLEU of three production MT systems on both high-resource and low-resource language pairs. We then leverage the similarity of our imitation models to transfer adversarial examples to the production systems. We use gradient-based attacks that expose inputs which lead to semanticallyincorrect translations, dropped content, and vulgar model outputs. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we propose a defense that modifies translation outputs in order to misdirect the optimization of imitation models. This defense degrades the adversary's BLEU score and attack success rate at some cost in the defender's BLEU and inference speed. Save me it's over 100°F

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

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have("2004.15015")

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