3 of 6 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 3 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2005.10884.json · badge: /api/ran/2005.10884.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| nicksum107/thesiswork | community (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
3 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| fill | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
nicksum107/thesiswork/displayim.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a449b45fba80d282") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| scale_logits | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
nicksum107/thesiswork/displayim.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("24f67888855f479b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| size_convert | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
nicksum107/thesiswork/eval_defense_cifar.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a4f5d26dba8dfb80") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| bagnet17 | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
nicksum107/thesiswork/nets/bagnet.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d384839c16c7bc00") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| bagnet33 | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
nicksum107/thesiswork/nets/bagnet.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("56a41202ec153a3a") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| bagnet9 | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
nicksum107/thesiswork/nets/bagnet.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2815f7239255f9f0") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 6 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 6 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 6 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (3 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| bagnet17 | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
1904.00760 (2019-04) Approximating CNNs with Bag-of-local-Features models works surprisingly well on ImageNet |
|
| bagnet33 | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
1904.00760 (2019-04) Approximating CNNs with Bag-of-local-Features models works surprisingly well on ImageNet |
|
| bagnet9 | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
1904.00760 (2019-04) Approximating CNNs with Bag-of-local-Features models works surprisingly well on ImageNet |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Localized adversarial patches aim to induce misclassification in machine learning models by arbitrarily modifying pixels within a restricted region of an image. Such attacks can be realized in the physical world by attaching the adversarial patch to the object to be misclassified, and defending against such attacks is an unsolved/open problem. In this paper, we propose a general defense framework called PatchGuard that can achieve high provable robustness while maintaining high clean accuracy against localized adversarial patches. The cornerstone of PatchGuard involves the use of CNNs with small receptive fields to impose a bound on the number of features corrupted by an adversarial patch. Given a bounded number of corrupted features, the problem of designing an adversarial patch defense reduces to that of designing a secure feature aggregation mechanism. Towards this end, we present our robust masking defense that robustly detects and masks corrupted features to recover the correct prediction. Notably, we can prove the robustness of our defense against any adversary within our threat model. Our extensive evaluation on ImageNet, ImageNette (a 10-class subset of ImageNet), and CIFAR-10 datasets demonstrates that our defense achieves state-of-the-art performance in terms of both provable robust accuracy and clean accuracy.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2005.10884")
get_code_for_paper("2005.10884")
have("2005.10884")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2005.10884.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2005.10884)
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