Jiaqi Ma, Qiaozhu Mei
3 of 6 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2006.05057.json · badge: /api/ran/2006.05057.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| mark12ding/gnn-practical-attack | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| theaperdeng/gnn-attack-infmax | extension (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
2 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| New_sort_erf_testsum | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
theaperdeng/gnn-attack-infmax/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("27df709d95d0bfb7") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| New_sort_sumtest | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
theaperdeng/gnn-attack-infmax/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b495853937d23deb") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| getScore | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
mark12ding/gnn-practical-attack/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a37e866ddc285b70") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Tensor. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| getScore | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
theaperdeng/gnn-attack-infmax/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("62cc074a62020b53") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| getScoreGreedy | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
mark12ding/gnn-practical-attack/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("193746d4ee64623c") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| getThrehold | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
mark12ding/gnn-practical-attack/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("22a55a7d9807a9d2") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 6 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 6 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 5 distinct functions with an identity, 5 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 5 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| New_sort_erf_testsum | 1 other paper 1 later |
2106.10785 (2021-06) Adversarial Attack on Graph Neural Networks as An Influence Maximization Problem |
|
| New_sort_sumtest | 1 other paper 1 later |
2106.10785 (2021-06) Adversarial Attack on Graph Neural Networks as An Influence Maximization Problem |
|
| getScore | 1 other paper 1 later |
2106.10785 (2021-06) Adversarial Attack on Graph Neural Networks as An Influence Maximization Problem |
|
| getScoreGreedy brick of this paper's assembly: entry |
1 other paper 1 later |
2106.10785 (2021-06) Adversarial Attack on Graph Neural Networks as An Influence Maximization Problem |
|
| getThrehold | 1 other paper 1 later |
2106.10785 (2021-06) Adversarial Attack on Graph Neural Networks as An Influence Maximization Problem |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
We study the black-box attacks on graph neural networks (GNNs) under a novel and realistic constraint: attackers have access to only a subset of nodes in the network, and they can only attack a small number of them. A node selection step is essential under this setup. We demonstrate that the structural inductive biases of GNN models can be an effective source for this type of attacks. Specifically, by exploiting the connection between the backward propagation of GNNs and random walks, we show that the common gradient-based white-box attacks can be generalized to the black-box setting via the connection between the gradient and an importance score similar to PageRank. In practice, we find attacks based on this importance score indeed increase the classification loss by a large margin, but they fail to significantly increase the mis-classification rate. Our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that there is a discrepancy between the loss and mis-classification rate, as the latter presents a diminishing-return pattern when the number of attacked nodes increases. Therefore, we propose a greedy procedure to correct the importance score that takes into account of the diminishing-return pattern. Experimental results show that the proposed procedure can significantly increase the mis-classification rate of common GNNs on real-world data without access to model parameters nor predictions 4 .
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2006.05057")
get_code_for_paper("2006.05057")
have("2006.05057")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2006.05057.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2006.05057)
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