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Paper · 2007.12861 · 2020

Adversarial Privacy-preserving Filter

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

4 of 5 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2007.12861.json · badge: /api/ran/2007.12861.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
adversarial-for-goodness/APF canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
4 ran · 1 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
clamp_by_l2 Ran
ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT)
adversarial-for-goodness/APF/Attack.py
pointer only (licence: GPL-3.0) · get_code("1f2c3eac81b5d4f4")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GPL-3.0, as GitHub detects it on this paper's repository, adversarial-for-goodness/APF, is not in the permissive set Syntology serves inline. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

gkern Ran
ran, honoured the contract we drafted
adversarial-for-goodness/APF/Attack.py
pointer only (licence: GPL-3.0) · get_code("5e1f60c820f3f710")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GPL-3.0, as GitHub detects it on this paper's repository, adversarial-for-goodness/APF, is not in the permissive set Syntology serves inline. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

load_model Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
adversarial-for-goodness/APF/apf_pytorch.py
pointer only (licence: GPL-3.0) · get_code("397486956e92c460")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GPL-3.0, as GitHub detects it on this paper's repository, adversarial-for-goodness/APF, is not in the permissive set Syntology serves inline. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

random_init Ran
ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT)
adversarial-for-goodness/APF/Attack.py
pointer only (licence: GPL-3.0) · get_code("494f4ea5941ef60d")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GPL-3.0, as GitHub detects it on this paper's repository, adversarial-for-goodness/APF, is not in the permissive set Syntology serves inline. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

MIDI Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
adversarial-for-goodness/APF/apf_pytorch.py
pointer only (licence: GPL-3.0) · get_code("4d2439777a1239fb")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GPL-3.0, as GitHub detects it on this paper's repository, adversarial-for-goodness/APF, is not in the permissive set Syntology serves inline. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded.

Also present in other papers' code

Of 5 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 5 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 5 distinct functions with an identity, 2 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 2 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

FunctionAlso present inEarliest-datedOthers named
clamp_by_l2 1 other paper
1 later
2404.19287 (2024-04)
Revisiting the Adversarial Robustness of Vision Language Models: a Multimodal Perspective
gkern 1 other paper
1 later
2404.19287 (2024-04)
Revisiting the Adversarial Robustness of Vision Language Models: a Multimodal Perspective

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

While widely adopted in practical applications, face recognition has been critically discussed regarding the malicious use of face images and the potential privacy problems, e.g., deceiving payment system and causing personal sabotage. Online photo sharing services unintentionally act as the main repository for malicious crawler and face recognition applications. This work aims to develop a privacy-preserving solution, called Adversarial Privacy-preserving Filter (APF), to protect the online shared face images from being maliciously used.We propose an end-cloud collaborated adversarial attack solution to satisfy requirements of privacy, utility and nonaccessibility. Specifically, the solutions consist of three modules: (1) image-specific gradient generation, to extract image-specific gradient in the user end with a compressed probe model; (2) adversarial gradient transfer, to fine-tune the image-specific gradient in the server cloud; and (3) universal adversarial perturbation enhancement, to append image-independent perturbation to derive the final adversarial noise. Extensive experiments on three datasets validate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed solution. A prototype application is also released for further evaluation.We hope the end-cloud collaborated attack framework could shed light on addressing the issue of online multimedia sharing privacy-preserving issues from user side.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

get_harvested_code_for_paper("2007.12861")
get_code_for_paper("2007.12861")
have("2007.12861")

The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:

curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2007.12861.json

A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):

[![Syntology run record](https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2007.12861.svg)](https://syntology.ai/paper/2007.12861)

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