1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 1 has no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2009.09258.json · badge: /api/ran/2009.09258.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| tsingqguo/jadena | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| augment | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
tsingqguo/jadena/lib/augment.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b2919c027c31c86f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Co-salient object detection (CoSOD) has recently achieved significant progress and played a key role in retrieval-related tasks. However, it inevitably poses an entirely new safety and security issue, i.e., highly personal and sensitive content can potentially be extracting by powerful CoSOD methods. In this paper, we address this problem from the perspective of adversarial attacks and identify a novel task: adversarial co-saliency attack. Specially, given an image selected from a group of images containing some common and salient objects, we aim to generate an adversarial version that can mislead CoSOD methods to predict incorrect co-salient regions. Note that, compared with general white-box adversarial attacks for classification, this new task faces two additional challenges: (1) low success rate due to the diverse appearance of images in the group; (2) low transferability across CoSOD methods due to the considerable difference between CoSOD pipelines. To address these challenges, we propose the very first black-box joint adversarial exposure and noise attack (Jadena), where we jointly and locally tune the exposure and additive perturbations of the image according to a newly designed high-feature-level contrast-sensitive loss function. Our method, without any information on the state-of-the-art CoSOD methods, leads to significant performance degradation on various co-saliency detection datasets and makes the co-salient objects undetectable. This can have strong practical benefits in properly securing the large number of personal photos currently shared on the Internet. Moreover, our method is potential to be utilized as a metric for evaluating the robustness of CoSOD methods.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2009.09258")
get_code_for_paper("2009.09258")
have("2009.09258")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2009.09258.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2009.09258)
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