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Paper · 2010.02772 · ICML · 2020

InstaHide: Instance-hiding Schemes for Private Distributed Learning *

Zhao Song, Yangsibo Huang, Kai Li, Sanjeev Arora

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

2 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 2 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run); 1 of them was also run on the host, not in the jail, by the peer-agreement lane that set its level, measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2010.02772.json · badge: /api/ran/2010.02772.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
Hazelsuko07/InstaHide canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
1 ran · 0 no recorded run
xj231/FDN community
Papers with Code archive
1 ran · 0 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
cross_entropy_for_onehot Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
Hazelsuko07/InstaHide/train_inside.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e4df01238c9e5ba5")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's jail on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. The comparison behind this sample's level is a different run: the peer-agreement lane ran it again on the host, not in the jail (report dated 2026-09-05T03:10:52Z). If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import torch
import torch.nn.functional as F

torch.manual_seed(0)

# Create small tensors for the function
# pred: logits tensor, shape (batch_size, num_classes)
# target: one-hot encoded targets, shape (batch_size, num_classes)

batch_size = 2
num_classes = 4

pred = torch.randn(batch_size, num_classes)
target = torch.zeros(batch_size, num_classes)
# Create one-hot encoded targets
target[0, 0] = 1.0
target[1, 2] = 1.0

ARGS = {
    "pred": pred,
    "target": target,
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1
Imports
torch — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () — shape () as a later run recorded it
dtype family
int means an integer dtype; float means any other dtype the instrument saw, bool and complex included (fixture_check.py records only these two families)
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block
mixpublic Ran
ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT)
xj231/FDN/2-generate-MixupImages.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("19358462b2250200")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, xj231/FDN when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

Also present in other papers' code

Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

FunctionAlso present inEarliest-datedOthers named
cross_entropy_for_onehot 4 other papers
2 dated earlier, 2 later
1906.08935 (2019-06)
Deep Leakage from Gradients
2003.07853 (2020-03)
Axial-DeepLab: Stand-Alone Axial-Attention for Panoptic Segmentation
2021.emnlp-main.154 (2021 (year only))
Reconstruction Attack on Instance Encoding for Language Understanding
and 1 more not named here

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

How can multiple distributed entities collaboratively train a shared deep net on their private data while preserving privacy? This paper introduces InstaHide, a simple encryption of training images, which can be plugged into existing distributed deep learning pipelines. The encryption is efficient and applying it during training has minor effect on test accuracy. InstaHide encrypts each training image with a "one-time secret key" which consists of mixing a number of randomly chosen images and applying a random pixel-wise mask. Other contributions of this paper include: (a) Using a large public dataset (e.g. ImageNet) for mixing during its encryption, which improves security. (b) Experimental results to show effectiveness in preserving privacy against known attacks with only minor effects on accuracy. (c) Theoretical analysis showing that successfully attacking privacy requires attackers to solve a difficult computational problem. (d) Demonstrating that use of the pixel-wise mask is important for security, since Mixup alone is shown to be insecure to some some efficient attacks. (e) Release of a challenge dataset 1 to encourage new attacks. Our code is available at https://github.com/Hazelsuko07/InstaHide.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

get_harvested_code_for_paper("2010.02772")
get_code_for_paper("2010.02772")
have("2010.02772")

The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:

curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2010.02772.json

A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):

[![Syntology run record](https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2010.02772.svg)](https://syntology.ai/paper/2010.02772)

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