2 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 2 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2010.04902.json · badge: /api/ran/2010.04902.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| kkonstantinidis/ByzShield | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| copy not recorded | community not in the paper's declared repositories |
1 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| add_fit_args | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
this paper's copy was not recorded; identical code first harvested from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield pointer only; the stored copy get_code serves, from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("ad4da1db77b0c2a2") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's copy of the code was not recorded (its link names no repository or source path), so no licence was read for it. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| add_fit_args | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
kkonstantinidis/ByzShield/src/distributed_nn.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("82b80195da259145") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, kkonstantinidis/ByzShield when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| accuracy | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
this paper's copy was not recorded; identical code first harvested from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield pointer only; the stored copy get_code serves, from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("4d3faaaa1c706b0b") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's copy of the code was not recorded (its link names no repository or source path), so no licence was read for it. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 2 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (2 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| accuracy | 23 other papers 15 dated earlier, 8 later |
1603.07285 (2016-03) A guide to convolution arithmetic for deep learning |
1608.07017 (2016-08) Ambient Sound Provides Supervision for Visual Learning 1608.08710 (2016-08) Pruning Filters for Efficient ConvNets and 20 more not named here |
| add_fit_args | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
1902.06156 (2019-02) A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learning |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Training of large scale models on distributed clusters is a critical component of the machine learning pipeline. However, this training can easily be made to fail if some workers behave in an adversarial (Byzantine) fashion whereby they return arbitrary results to the parameter server (PS). A plethora of existing papers consider a variety of attack models and propose robust aggregation and/or computational redundancy to alleviate the effects of these attacks. In this work we consider an omniscient attack model where the adversary has full knowledge about the gradient computation assignments of the workers and can choose to attack (up to) any q out of K worker nodes to induce maximal damage. Our redundancy-based method ByzShield leverages the properties of bipartite expander graphs for the assignment of tasks to workers; this helps to effectively mitigate the effect of the Byzantine behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate an upper bound on the worst case fraction of corrupted gradients based on the eigenvalues of our constructions which are based on mutually orthogonal Latin squares and Ramanujan graphs. Our numerical experiments indicate over a 36% reduction on average in the fraction of corrupted gradients compared to the state of the art. Likewise, our experiments on training followed by image classification on the CIFAR-10 dataset show that ByzShield has on average a 20% advantage in accuracy under the most sophisticated attacks. ByzShield also tolerates a much larger fraction of adversarial nodes compared to prior work.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2010.04902")
get_code_for_paper("2010.04902")
have("2010.04902")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2010.04902.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2010.04902)
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