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Paper · 2010.04902 · 2020

ByzShield: An Efficient and Robust System for Distributed Training

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

2 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 2 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2010.04902.json · badge: /api/ran/2010.04902.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
kkonstantinidis/ByzShield canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
1 ran · 0 no recorded run
copy not recorded community
not in the paper's declared repositories
1 ran · 1 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
add_fit_args Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
this paper's copy was not recorded; identical code first harvested from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield
pointer only; the stored copy get_code serves, from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("ad4da1db77b0c2a2")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: this paper's copy of the code was not recorded (its link names no repository or source path), so no licence was read for it. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

add_fit_args Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
kkonstantinidis/ByzShield/src/distributed_nn.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("82b80195da259145")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, kkonstantinidis/ByzShield when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

accuracy Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
this paper's copy was not recorded; identical code first harvested from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield
pointer only; the stored copy get_code serves, from kkonstantinidis/ByzShield, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("4d3faaaa1c706b0b")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: this paper's copy of the code was not recorded (its link names no repository or source path), so no licence was read for it. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded.

Also present in other papers' code

Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 2 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (2 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

FunctionAlso present inEarliest-datedOthers named
accuracy 23 other papers
15 dated earlier, 8 later
1603.07285 (2016-03)
A guide to convolution arithmetic for deep learning
1608.07017 (2016-08)
Ambient Sound Provides Supervision for Visual Learning
1608.08710 (2016-08)
Pruning Filters for Efficient ConvNets
and 20 more not named here
add_fit_args 1 other paper
1 dated earlier
1902.06156 (2019-02)
A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learning

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Training of large scale models on distributed clusters is a critical component of the machine learning pipeline. However, this training can easily be made to fail if some workers behave in an adversarial (Byzantine) fashion whereby they return arbitrary results to the parameter server (PS). A plethora of existing papers consider a variety of attack models and propose robust aggregation and/or computational redundancy to alleviate the effects of these attacks. In this work we consider an omniscient attack model where the adversary has full knowledge about the gradient computation assignments of the workers and can choose to attack (up to) any q out of K worker nodes to induce maximal damage. Our redundancy-based method ByzShield leverages the properties of bipartite expander graphs for the assignment of tasks to workers; this helps to effectively mitigate the effect of the Byzantine behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate an upper bound on the worst case fraction of corrupted gradients based on the eigenvalues of our constructions which are based on mutually orthogonal Latin squares and Ramanujan graphs. Our numerical experiments indicate over a 36% reduction on average in the fraction of corrupted gradients compared to the state of the art. Likewise, our experiments on training followed by image classification on the CIFAR-10 dataset show that ByzShield has on average a 20% advantage in accuracy under the most sophisticated attacks. ByzShield also tolerates a much larger fraction of adversarial nodes compared to prior work.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

get_harvested_code_for_paper("2010.04902")
get_code_for_paper("2010.04902")
have("2010.04902")

The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:

curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2010.04902.json

A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):

[![Syntology run record](https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2010.04902.svg)](https://syntology.ai/paper/2010.04902)

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