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Paper · 2012.02525 · NeurIPS · 2020

Practical No-box Adversarial Attacks against DNNs

Qizhang Li, Yiwen Guo, Hao Chen

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

None of the 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories has a recorded run on a synthesized input (2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-21; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2012.02525.json · badge: /api/ran/2012.02525.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
qizhangli/nobox-attacks canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
0 ran · 1 no recorded run
hashmatshadab/apr community
Papers with Code archive
0 ran · 1 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
attack_ce_proto Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
qizhangli/nobox-attacks/attack.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("7dadb98c271d1518")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, qizhangli/nobox-attacks when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded.

train_prototypical Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
hashmatshadab/apr/train_id.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("1eb7e5187bcbe022")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, hashmatshadab/apr when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded.

Also present in other papers' code

Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-21.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/qizhangli/nobox-attacks.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

get_harvested_code_for_paper("2012.02525")
get_code_for_paper("2012.02525")
have("2012.02525")

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[![Syntology run record](https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2012.02525.svg)](https://syntology.ai/paper/2012.02525)

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