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Paper · 2012.08723 · 2020

Exacerbating Algorithmic Bias through Fairness Attacks

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

3 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-21; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2012.08723.json · badge: /api/ran/2012.08723.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
Ninarehm/attack canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
3 ran · 0 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
get_projection_to_box_around_orig_point Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
Ninarehm/attack/Fairness_attack/influence/influence/dataset_poisoning.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("68ad19597304e430")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned function. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import numpy as np

# Test case 1: with X_orig provided
X_orig = np.random.randn(2, 4).astype(np.float32) * 0.5

ARGS = {
    "X_orig": X_orig,
    "box_radius_in_pixels": 0.5,
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API
Imports
numpy — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type function — a function output has no array shape of its own; none is stated — the instrument coerces any output to an array; for a function output the recorded ndim 0 and dtype family float describe that coercion, not the output, and are not stated
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block
poison_with_influence_proj_gradient_step Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
Ninarehm/attack/Fairness_attack/influence/influence/dataset_poisoning.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5a433e963babd1cc")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (3, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import numpy as np
import torch
import torch.nn as nn

torch.manual_seed(0)

class Dataset:
    def __init__(self, x, y):
        self.x = x
        self.y = y

class DataSets:
    def __init__(self):
        self.train = Dataset(
            x=np.random.randn(10, 4).astype(np.float32),
            y=np.random.randint(0, 2, 10)
        )

class SimpleModel(nn.Module):
    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        self.linear = nn.Linear(4, 2)
        self.data_sets = DataSets()
    
    def forward(self, x):
        return self.linear(x)

def projection_fn(x):
    """Project values to valid image range [0, 1]"""
    return np.clip(x, 0.0, 1.0)

model = SimpleModel()
indices_to_poison = np.array([0, 2, 5])
grad_influence_wrt_input_val_subset = np.random.randn(3, 4).astype(np.float32)
step_size = 0.01

ARGS = {
    'model': model,
    'indices_to_poison': indices_to_poison,
    'grad_influence_wrt_input_val_subset': grad_influence_wrt_input_val_subset,
    'step_size': step_size,
    'project_fn': projection_fn
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API
Imports
numpy, torch — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (3, 4) — shape (3, 4) as a later run recorded it
dtype family
int means an integer dtype; float means any other dtype the instrument saw, bool and complex included (fixture_check.py records only these two families)
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block
select_examples_to_attack Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
Ninarehm/attack/Fairness_attack/influence/influence/dataset_poisoning.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("09fe17271407a870")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 1, dtype family int, shape (2,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import numpy as np
import torch
import torch.nn as nn

torch.manual_seed(0)

# Create a minimal model (not actually used in the function, but required as parameter)
class DummyModel(nn.Module):
    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        self.linear = nn.Linear(4, 2)
    
    def forward(self, x):
        return self.linear(x)

model = DummyModel()

# Number of examples to poison
num_to_poison = 2

# Gradient influence with respect to input validation data
# Shape: (batch_size, feature_dim)
# Using batch_size=5 and feature_dim=4 to match function usage
grad_influence_wrt_input_val = np.random.randn(5, 4)

# Step size (not used in function body, but required as parameter)
step_size = 0.01

ARGS = {
    "model": model,
    "num_to_poison": num_to_poison,
    "grad_influence_wrt_input_val": grad_influence_wrt_input_val,
    "step_size": step_size
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API
Imports
numpy, torch — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type ndarray, ndim 1, dtype family int, shape (2,) — shape (2,) as a later run recorded it
dtype family
int means an integer dtype; float means any other dtype the instrument saw, bool and complex included (fixture_check.py records only these two families)
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block

Also present in other papers' code

Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (3 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

FunctionAlso present inEarliest-datedOthers named
get_projection_to_box_around_orig_point 1 other paper
1 dated earlier
1703.04730 (2017-03)
Understanding Black-box Predictions via Influence Functions
poison_with_influence_proj_gradient_step 1 other paper
1 dated earlier
1703.04730 (2017-03)
Understanding Black-box Predictions via Influence Functions
select_examples_to_attack 1 other paper
1 dated earlier
1703.04730 (2017-03)
Understanding Black-box Predictions via Influence Functions

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-21.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Algorithmic fairness has attracted significant attention in recent years, with many quantitative measures suggested for characterizing the fairness of different machine learning algorithms. Despite this interest, the robustness of those fairness measures with respect to an intentional adversarial attack has not been properly addressed. Indeed, most adversarial machine learning has focused on the impact of malicious attacks on the accuracy of the system, without any regard to the system's fairness. We propose new types of data poisoning attacks where an adversary intentionally targets the fairness of a system. Specifically, we propose two families of attacks that target fairness measures. In the anchoring attack, we skew the decision boundary by placing poisoned points near specific target points to bias the outcome. In the influence attack on fairness, we aim to maximize the covariance between the sensitive attributes and the decision outcome and affect the fairness of the model. We conduct extensive experiments that indicate the effectiveness of our proposed attacks.

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