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Paper · 2012.10438 · 2020

Efficient Training of Robust Decision Trees Against Adversarial Examples

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-21; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2012.10438.json · badge: /api/ran/2012.10438.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
tudelft-cda-lab/GROOT canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
1 ran · 0 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
node_tree_to_arrays Ran
ran, honoured the contract we drafted
tudelft-cda-lab/GROOT/groot/model.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("82859de8752bbcdc")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 2, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import numpy as np

_TREE_LEAF = -1
_TREE_UNDEFINED = -2

class Node:
    """Base class for decision tree nodes, also functions as leaf."""

    def __init__(self, feature, left_child, right_child, value):
        self.feature = feature
        self.left_child = left_child
        self.right_child = right_child
        self.value = value

    def predict(self, _):
        assert self.left_child == _TREE_LEAF
        assert self.right_child == _TREE_LEAF
        return self.value

    def pretty_print(self, _, depth=0):
        indentation = depth * '  '
        if isinstance(self.value, np.ndarray):
            return f'{indentation}return [{self.value[0]:.3f}, {self.value[1]:.3f}]'
        else:
            return f'{indentation}return {self.value:.3f}'

    def to_json(self):
        if isinstance(self.value, np.ndarray):
            return {'value': [self.value[0], self.value[1]]}
        else:
            return {'value': self.value}

    def to_xgboost_json(self, node_id, depth):
        if isinstance(self.value, np.ndarray):
            return ({'nodeid': node_id, 'leaf': self.value[1] * 2 - 1}, node_id)
        else:
            return ({'nodeid': node_id, 'leaf': self.value}, node_id)

    def is_leaf(self):
        return self.left_child == _TREE_LEAF and self.right_child == _TREE_LEAF

    def prune(self, _):
        return self


# Create a simple leaf node with a scalar value
leaf_node = Node(
    feature=_TREE_LEAF,
    left_child=_TREE_LEAF,
    right_child=_TREE_LEAF,
    value=0.5
)

ARGS = {
    'node': leaf_node
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API
Imports
numpy — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type tuple, ndim 2, dtype family float — a tuple output has no array shape of its own; none is stated
dtype family
int means an integer dtype; float means any other dtype the instrument saw, bool and complex included (fixture_check.py records only these two families)
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block

Also present in other papers' code

Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-21.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

In the present day we use machine learning for sensitive tasks that require models to be both understandable and robust. Although traditional models such as decision trees are understandable, they suffer from adversarial attacks. When a decision tree is used to differentiate between a user's benign and malicious behavior, an adversarial attack allows the user to effectively evade the model by perturbing the inputs the model receives. We can use algorithms that take adversarial attacks into account to fit trees that are more robust. In this work we propose an algorithm, GROOT, that is two orders of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art-work while scoring competitively on accuracy against adversaries. GROOT accepts an intuitive and permissible threat model. Where previous threat models were limited to distance norms, we allow each feature to be perturbed with a user-specified parameter: either a maximum distance or constraints on the direction of perturbation. Previous works assumed that both benign and malicious users attempt model evasion but we allow the user to select which classes perform adversarial attacks. Additionally, we introduce a hyperparameter rho that allows GROOT to trade off performance in the regular and adversarial settings.

For agents

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get_code_for_paper("2012.10438")
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