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Paper · 2102.02551 · 2021

ML-Doctor: Holistic Risk Assessment of Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

1 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2102.02551.json · badge: /api/ran/2102.02551.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
liuyugeng/ml-doctor canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
1 ran · 2 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
get_attack_dataset_without_shadow Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
liuyugeng/ml-doctor/doctor/meminf.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6504bf3802e2af83")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import torch

torch.manual_seed(0)

# Create small dummy datasets
# Each sample is a tuple of (data, label)
train_samples = [(torch.randn(4), torch.tensor(i % 2)) for i in range(12)]
test_samples = [(torch.randn(4), torch.tensor(i % 2)) for i in range(12)]

train_set = train_samples
test_set = test_samples

ARGS = {
    "train_set": train_set,
    "test_set": test_set,
    "batch_size": 2,
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1
Imports
torch — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float — a tuple output has no array shape of its own; none is stated
dtype family
int means an integer dtype; float means any other dtype the instrument saw, bool and complex included (fixture_check.py records only these two families)
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block
train_attack_model Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
liuyugeng/ml-doctor/doctor/attrinf.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("dbd4383b2b56f823")
How it ran

no invocation recorded.

train_shadow_distillation Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
liuyugeng/ml-doctor/doctor/meminf.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("664dc8c7e8f8f11d")
How it ran

no invocation recorded.

Also present in other papers' code

Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

FunctionAlso present inEarliest-datedOthers named
train_shadow_distillation 1 other paper
1 later
2311.14056 (2023-11)
DPSUR: Accelerating Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent Using Selective Update and Release

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Inference attacks against Machine Learning (ML) models allow adversaries to learn sensitive information about training data, model parameters, etc. While researchers have studied, in depth, several kinds of attacks, they have done so in isolation. As a result, we lack a comprehensive picture of the risks caused by the attacks, e.g., the different scenarios they can be applied to, the common factors that influence their performance, the relationship among them, or the effectiveness of possible defenses. In this paper, we fill this gap by presenting a first-of-its-kind holistic risk assessment of different inference attacks against machine learning models. We concentrate on four attacks -- namely, membership inference, model inversion, attribute inference, and model stealing -- and establish a threat model taxonomy. Our extensive experimental evaluation, run on five model architectures and four image datasets, shows that the complexity of the training dataset plays an important role with respect to the attack's performance, while the effectiveness of model stealing and membership inference attacks are negatively correlated. We also show that defenses like DP-SGD and Knowledge Distillation can only mitigate some of the inference attacks. Our analysis relies on a modular re-usable software, ML-Doctor, which enables ML model owners to assess the risks of deploying their models, and equally serves as a benchmark tool for researchers and practitioners.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

get_harvested_code_for_paper("2102.02551")
get_code_for_paper("2102.02551")
have("2102.02551")

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