Virginia Smith, Xin Yang, Oscar Li, Jiankai Sun, Weihao Gao, Hongyi Zhang, Junyuan Xie, Chong Wang
1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2102.08504.json · badge: /api/ran/2102.08504.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| Koukyosyumei/AIJack | community Papers with Code archive |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| attach_normattack_to_splitnn | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Koukyosyumei/AIJack/src/aijack/attack/labelleakage/normattack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e1b8d70923b7960e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned type. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Two-party split learning is a popular technique for learning a model across feature-partitioned data. In this work, we explore whether it is possible for one party to steal the private label information from the other party during split training, and whether there are methods that can protect against such attacks. Specifically, we first formulate a realistic threat model and propose a privacy loss metric to quantify label leakage in split learning. We then show that there exist two simple yet effective methods within the threat model that can allow one party to accurately recover private ground-truth labels owned by the other party. To combat these attacks, we propose several random perturbation techniques, including Marvell, an approach that strategically finds the structure of the noise perturbation by minimizing the amount of label leakage (measured through our quantification metric) of a worst-case adversary. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our protection techniques against the identified attacks, and show that Marvell in particular has improved privacy-utility tradeoffs relative to baseline approaches.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2102.08504")
get_code_for_paper("2102.08504")
have("2102.08504")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2102.08504.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2102.08504)
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