Shu-Tao Xia, Yiming Li, Jiawang Bai, Baoyuan Wu, Yong Zhang, Zhifeng Li
3 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 2 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2102.10496.json · badge: /api/ran/2102.10496.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| jiawangbai/TA-LBF | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
3 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| project_box | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
jiawangbai/TA-LBF/attack_one.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("bdf2f58dce9ed6ee") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, jiawangbai/TA-LBF when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| project_positive | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
jiawangbai/TA-LBF/attack_one.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("494eaeaa9643571a") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, jiawangbai/TA-LBF when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| project_shifted_Lp_ball | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
jiawangbai/TA-LBF/attack_one.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("fae6c9336a515453") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, jiawangbai/TA-LBF when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 3 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| project_box | 2 other papers 2 later |
Ozdenizci_Improving_Robustness_Against_Stealthy_Weight_Bit-Flip_Attacks_by_Output_Code_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Improving Robustness Against Stealthy Weight Bit-Flip Attacks by Output Code Matching |
2207.12405 (2022-07) Versatile Weight Attack via Flipping Limited Bits |
| project_positive | 2 other papers 2 later |
Ozdenizci_Improving_Robustness_Against_Stealthy_Weight_Bit-Flip_Attacks_by_Output_Code_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Improving Robustness Against Stealthy Weight Bit-Flip Attacks by Output Code Matching |
2207.12405 (2022-07) Versatile Weight Attack via Flipping Limited Bits |
| project_shifted_Lp_ball | 2 other papers 2 later |
Ozdenizci_Improving_Robustness_Against_Stealthy_Weight_Bit-Flip_Attacks_by_Output_Code_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Improving Robustness Against Stealthy Weight Bit-Flip Attacks by Output Code Matching |
2207.12405 (2022-07) Versatile Weight Attack via Flipping Limited Bits |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
To explore the vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs), many attack paradigms have been well studied, such as the poisoning-based backdoor attack in the training stage and the adversarial attack in the inference stage. In this paper, we study a novel attack paradigm, which modifies model parameters in the deployment stage for malicious purposes. Specifically, our goal is to misclassify a specific sample into a target class without any sample modification, while not significantly reduce the prediction accuracy of other samples to ensure the stealthiness. To this end, we formulate this problem as a binary integer programming (BIP), since the parameters are stored as binary bits (i.e., 0 and 1) in the memory. By utilizing the latest technique in integer programming, we equivalently reformulate this BIP problem as a continuous optimization problem, which can be effectively and efficiently solved using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) method. Consequently, the flipped critical bits can be easily determined through optimization, rather than using a heuristic strategy. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our method in attacking DNNs. The code is available at: https://github.com/jiawangbai/TA-LBF.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2102.10496")
get_code_for_paper("2102.10496")
have("2102.10496")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2102.10496.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2102.10496)
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