7 of 10 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 2 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 5 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2104.15129.json · badge: /api/ran/2104.15129.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
7 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| add_inputs_with_trigger | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/precision_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ff3b74e78c31e77d") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 3, 32, 32) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_trigger_image | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/precision_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("26cd848697f27333") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 3, dtype family float, shape (3, 3, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_vgg16 | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/models/vgg_original.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b9309fc99690f67b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned VGG. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| tensor_normalize | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/precision_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b0693db7b7ac899f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 3, 4, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| test | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/train_baseline_models/auto_compress_for_clean_models.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("400fad4c2a965a37") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned float, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| trans_state_dict_pruning_test | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/trojan_detection_mntd/run_meta_verify_compression_backdoor.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2c4031d6d415bebd") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned OrderedDict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| trans_state_dict_test | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/trojan_detection_mntd/run_meta_verify_compression_backdoor.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d0df92871fcae1d3") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned OrderedDict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| find_epoch | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/train_quantization_attack/verify_models_average.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("66d391a79ddc790c") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| find_epoch | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/train_quantization_attack/verify_models_average_similar_dataset.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8668a99ae353e52a") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_normal_model | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
yulongtzzz/Stealthy-Backdoors-as-Compression-Artifacts/trojan_detection_mntd/run_meta_verify_compression_backdoor.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e20dc6c0d50fc5d7") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 10 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 10 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 10 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 10 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
In a backdoor attack on a machine learning model, an adversary produces a model that performs well on normal inputs but outputs targeted misclassifications on inputs containing a small trigger pattern. Model compression is a widely-used approach for reducing the size of deep learning models without much accuracy loss, enabling resource-hungry models to be compressed for use on resource-constrained devices. In this paper, we study the risk that model compression could provide an opportunity for adversaries to inject stealthy backdoors. We design stealthy backdoor attacks such that the full-sized model released by adversaries appears to be free from backdoors (even when tested using state-of-the-art techniques), but when the model is compressed it exhibits highly effective backdoors. We show this can be done for two common model compression techniques -- model pruning and model quantization. Our findings demonstrate how an adversary may be able to hide a backdoor as a compression artifact, and show the importance of performing security tests on the models that will actually be deployed not their precompressed version.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2104.15129")
get_code_for_paper("2104.15129")
have("2104.15129")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2104.15129.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2104.15129)
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