Enhong Chen, Hao Wang, Qi Liu, Zaixi Zhang, Chengqiang Lu, Zhenya Huang, Chuanren Liu
1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 1 has no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2106.02820.json · badge: /api/ran/2106.02820.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| zaixizhang/GraphMI | marked official in Papers with Code Papers with Code archive |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| BaseAttack | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
zaixizhang/GraphMI/base_attack.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("4401c0d2d1104076") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, zaixizhang/GraphMI when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| BaseAttack brick of this paper's assembly: entry |
1 other paper 1 later |
2306.09104 (2023-06) On Strengthening and Defending Graph Reconstruction Attack with Markov Chain Approximation |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
As machine learning becomes more widely used for critical applications, the need to study its implications in privacy turns to be urgent. Given access to the target model and auxiliary information, model inversion attack aims to infer sensitive features of the training dataset, which leads to great privacy concerns. Despite its success in grid-like domains, directly applying model inversion techniques on non-grid domains such as graph achieves poor attack performance due to the difficulty to fully exploit the intrinsic properties of graphs and attributes of nodes used in Graph Neural Networks (GNN). To bridge this gap, we present Graph Model Inversion attack (GraphMI), which aims to extract private graph data of the training graph by inverting GNN, one of the state-of-theart graph analysis tools. Specifically, we firstly propose a projected gradient module to tackle the discreteness of graph edges while preserving sparsity and smoothness of graph features. Then we design a graph auto-encoder module to efficiently exploit graph topology, node attributes, and target model parameters for edge inference. With the proposed methods, we study the connection between model inversion risk and edge influence and show that edges with greater influence are more likely to be recovered. Extensive experiments over several public datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. We also show that differential privacy in its canonical form can hardly defend our attack while preserving decent utility.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2106.02820")
get_code_for_paper("2106.02820")
have("2106.02820")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2106.02820.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2106.02820)
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