We have not lifted any functions out of this paper's repositories yet, so there is nothing we have run. The repositories linked to it are listed below.
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Backdoor attacks inject poisoning samples during training, with the goal of forcing a machine learning model to output an attacker-chosen class when presented a specific trigger at test time. Although backdoor attacks have been demonstrated in a variety of settings and against different models, the factors affecting their effectiveness are still not well understood. In this work, we provide a unifying framework to study the process of backdoor learning under the lens of incremental learning and influence functions. We show that the effectiveness of backdoor attacks depends on: (i) the complexity of the learning algorithm, controlled by its hyperparameters; (ii) the fraction of backdoor samples injected into the training set; and (iii) the size and visibility of the backdoor trigger. These factors affect how fast a model learns to correlate the presence of the backdoor trigger with the target class. Our analysis unveils the intriguing existence of a region in the hyperparameter space in which the accuracy on clean test samples is still high while backdoor attacks are ineffective, thereby suggesting novel criteria to improve existing defenses.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2106.07214")
get_code_for_paper("2106.07214")
have("2106.07214")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2106.07214.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2106.07214)
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