5 of 8 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 1 has no contract verdict; 4 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2108.00352.json · badge: /api/ran/2108.00352.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| jinyuan-jia/badencoder | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
0 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| liu00222/StolenEncoder | community (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
3 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| jsrdcht/SSL-Backdoor | reimplementation (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
2 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| giantseaweed/decree | extension (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
0 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| AverageSim | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
liu00222/StolenEncoder/CLIP/evaluate_surrogate_encoder.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5d3d807d2cd79131") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned float32, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| conv1x1 | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
liu00222/StolenEncoder/CLIP/models/imagenet_model.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("158bf4c3a5f11f04") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Conv2d. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| conv3x3 | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
liu00222/StolenEncoder/CLIP/models/imagenet_model.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("29df79c9fdb0cee8") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Conv2d. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| create_torch_dataloader | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
jsrdcht/SSL-Backdoor/ssl_backdoor/attacks/badencoder/badencoder.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("cf100d49bb98767a") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned DataLoader. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| predict_feature | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
jsrdcht/SSL-Backdoor/ssl_backdoor/attacks/badencoder/badencoder.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8c3820f76db73254") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_multi_backdoor_imagenet | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
liu00222/StolenEncoder/CLIP/datasets/imagenet_dataset.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e8227b733fdf9db2") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| train | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
jinyuan-jia/badencoder/badencoder.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("f932268000bef667") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, jinyuan-jia/badencoder when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| train | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
giantseaweed/decree/attack_encoder.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("7c0b8c4203703d28") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, giantseaweed/decree when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 8 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 8 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 8 distinct functions with an identity, 5 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (4 with at least one paper dated earlier, 2 the same month, 5 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| conv1x1 | 431 other papers 141 dated earlier, 7 the same month, 277 later, 5 same year, order not determinable, 1 undated · 38 only as an assembly brick |
1409.1556 (2014-09) Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition |
1506.01186 (2015-06) Cyclical Learning Rates for Training Neural Networks 1507.05717 (2015-07) An End-to-End Trainable Neural Network for Image-based Sequence Recognition and Its Application to Scene Text Recognition and 428 more not named here |
| conv3x3 | 312 other papers 84 dated earlier, 6 the same month, 218 later, 3 same year, order not determinable, 1 undated · 31 only as an assembly brick |
1409.1556 (2014-09) Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition |
1507.05717 (2015-07) An End-to-End Trainable Neural Network for Image-based Sequence Recognition and Its Application to Scene Text Recognition 1512.03385 (2015-12) Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition and 309 more not named here |
| create_torch_dataloader | 2 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 later |
2105.10123 (2021-05) Backdoor Attacks on Self-Supervised Learning |
2210.07346 (2022-10) An Embarrassingly Simple Backdoor Attack on Self-supervised Learning |
| predict_feature | 2 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 later |
2105.10123 (2021-05) Backdoor Attacks on Self-Supervised Learning |
2210.07346 (2022-10) An Embarrassingly Simple Backdoor Attack on Self-supervised Learning |
| train | 1 other paper 1 later |
2303.15180 (2023-03) Detecting Backdoors in Pre-trained Encoders |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Self-supervised learning in computer vision aims to pre-train an image encoder using a large amount of unlabeled images or (image, text) pairs. The pre-trained image encoder can then be used as a feature extractor to build downstream classifiers for many downstream tasks with a small amount of or no labeled training data. In this work, we propose BadEncoder, the first backdoor attack to self-supervised learning. In particular, our BadEncoder injects backdoors into a pre-trained image encoder such that the downstream classifiers built based on the backdoored image encoder for different downstream tasks simultaneously inherit the backdoor behavior. We formulate our BadEncoder as an optimization problem and we propose a gradient descent based method to solve it, which produces a backdoored image encoder from a clean one. Our extensive empirical evaluation results on multiple datasets show that our BadEncoder achieves high attack success rates while preserving the accuracy of the downstream classifiers. We also show the effectiveness of BadEncoder using two publicly available, real-world image encoders, i.e., Google's image encoder pre-trained on ImageNet and OpenAI's Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) image encoder pre-trained on 400 million (image, text) pairs collected from the Internet. Moreover, we consider defenses including Neural Cleanse and MNTD (empirical defenses) as well as PatchGuard (a provable defense). Our results show that these defenses are insufficient to defend against BadEncoder, highlighting the needs for new defenses against our BadEncoder. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/jjy1994/BadEncoder.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2108.00352")
get_code_for_paper("2108.00352")
have("2108.00352")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2108.00352.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2108.00352)
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