None of the 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories has a recorded run on a synthesized input (2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2108.09033.json · badge: /api/ran/2108.09033.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| ege-erdogan/unsplit | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
0 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| label_inference | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ege-erdogan/unsplit/unsplit/attacks.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("b687ebee8d6640a9") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, ege-erdogan/unsplit when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| model_inversion_stealing | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ege-erdogan/unsplit/unsplit/attacks.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("ee908598a66f5201") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, ege-erdogan/unsplit when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Training deep neural networks often forces users to work in a distributed or outsourced setting, accompanied with privacy concerns. Split learning aims to address this concern by distributing the model among a client and a server. The scheme supposedly provides privacy, since the server cannot see the clients' models and inputs. We show that this is not true via two novel attacks. (1) We show that an honest-but-curious split learning server, equipped only with the knowledge of the client neural network architecture, can recover the input samples and obtain a functionally similar model to the client model, without being detected. (2) We show that if the client keeps hidden only the output layer of the model to "protect" the private labels, the honest-but-curious server can infer the labels with perfect accuracy. We test our attacks using various benchmark datasets and against proposed privacy-enhancing extensions to split learning. Our results show that plaintext split learning can pose serious risks, ranging from data (input) privacy to intellectual property (model parameters), and provide no more than a false sense of security.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2108.09033")
get_code_for_paper("2108.09033")
have("2108.09033")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2108.09033.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2108.09033)
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