Yuan He, Dantong Niu, Yun Yang, Yuefeng Chen, Ranjie Duan, † Qin
7 of 10 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 5 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2108.09034.json · badge: /api/ran/2108.09034.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| rjduan/advdrop | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
7 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| c_dequantize | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
rjduan/advdrop/decompression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("596cb14b592e24f4") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 3, dtype family float, shape (2, 4, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| dequantize | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
rjduan/advdrop/decompression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a9d0f5460a619666") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 3, 4, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| diff_round | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
rjduan/advdrop/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("37251df462837488") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| quality_to_factor | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
rjduan/advdrop/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8ae1de364298b758") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned float, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| rgb_to_ycbcr_jpeg | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
rjduan/advdrop/compression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("c93c595b23ffc2cd") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 4, 5, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| sgn | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
rjduan/advdrop/compression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ad42dc86b651cdba") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| y_dequantize | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
rjduan/advdrop/decompression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d86df89e5f91da6a") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 3, dtype family float, shape (2, 4, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| phi_diff | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
rjduan/advdrop/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("c8febed4b57496fc") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| pred_label_and_confidence | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
rjduan/advdrop/infod_sample.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b913e382e34034a5") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| rgb_to_ycbcr | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
rjduan/advdrop/compression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9f06caf2e03e050d") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 10 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 10 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 10 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 3 later) and 7 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| diff_round | 6 other papers 6 later |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images |
2207.03574 (2022-07) Demystifying the Adversarial Robustness of Random Transformation Defenses 2307.06948 (2023-07) Self-regulating Prompts: Foundational Model Adaptation without Forgetting and 3 more not named here |
| quality_to_factor | 4 other papers 4 later |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images |
2309.03020 (2023-09) SEAL: A Framework for Systematic Evaluation of Real-World Super-Resolution 2310.19011 (2023-10) Efficient Test-Time Adaptation for Super-Resolution with Second-Order Degradation and Reconstruction and 1 more not named here |
| phi_diff | 1 other paper 1 later |
2307.06948 (2023-07) Self-regulating Prompts: Foundational Model Adaptation without Forgetting |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Human can easily recognize visual objects with lost information: even losing most details with only contour reserved, e.g. cartoon. However, in terms of visual perception of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), the ability for recognizing abstract objects (visual objects with lost information) is still a challenge. In this work, we investigate this issue from an adversarial viewpoint: will the performance of DNNs decrease even for the images only losing a little information? Towards this end, we propose a novel adversarial attack, named AdvDrop, which crafts adversarial examples by dropping existing information of images. Previously, most adversarial attacks add extra disturbing information on clean images explicitly. Opposite to previous works, our proposed work explores the adversarial robustness of DNN models in a novel perspective by dropping imperceptible details to craft adversarial examples. We demonstrate the effectiveness of AdvDrop by extensive experiments, and show that this new type of adversarial examples is more difficult to be defended by current defense systems.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2108.09034")
get_code_for_paper("2108.09034")
have("2108.09034")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2108.09034.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2108.09034)
Connect an agent — have() is free.