2 of 11 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 2 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 9 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2109.08266.json · badge: /api/ran/2109.08266.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| ngmarchant/attack-unlearning | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
2 ran · 9 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| l1_proj | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/projections.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("fd3e40a8f8b31a66") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ArrayImpl, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| tree_zeros_like | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("503701aad49b036e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| fashion_mnist | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/datasets.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8a5e359aa5894852") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| lbfgs_minimize | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/lbfgs_minimize.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("16544f7487331b0e") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| linf_proj | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/projections.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ac0824e8d3c3c2b8") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| mnist | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/datasets.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2d79a5710c3e0b38") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| mnist_binary | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/datasets.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9fa62c93e01e3e6b") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| normalize | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/init_experiment.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("efd91a4d57b99306") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| proj_grad_descent | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/grad_descent.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3936f0ddb76eb43a") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| register_pytree_node_dataclass | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("303a2ef6d3d8fe00") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| soft_thresh | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ngmarchant/attack-unlearning/projections.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("1e6c97b7639df426") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 11 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 11 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 11 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 11 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
The right to erasure requires removal of a user's information from data held by organizations, with rigorous interpretations extending to downstream products such as learned models. Retraining from scratch with the particular user's data omitted fully removes its influence on the resulting model, but comes with a high computational cost. Machine "unlearning" mitigates the cost incurred by full retraining: instead, models are updated incrementally, possibly only requiring retraining when approximation errors accumulate. Rapid progress has been made towards privacy guarantees on the indistinguishability of unlearned and retrained models, but current formalisms do not place practical bounds on computation. In this paper we demonstrate how an attacker can exploit this oversight, highlighting a novel attack surface introduced by machine unlearning. We consider an attacker aiming to increase the computational cost of data removal. We derive and empirically investigate a poisoning attack on certified machine unlearning where strategically designed training data triggers complete retraining when removed.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2109.08266")
get_code_for_paper("2109.08266")
have("2109.08266")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2109.08266.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2109.08266)
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