Divyat Mahajan, Shruti Tople, Amit Sharma
1 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 1 has no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2110.03369.json · badge: /api/ran/2110.03369.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| microsoft/robustdg | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
1 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| alexnet | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
microsoft/robustdg/models/alexnet.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("c5cd97ace2ebac33") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned AlexNet. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_noise_multiplier | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
microsoft/robustdg/algorithms/algo.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("cd6f73e301d4e043") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
With the goal of generalizing to out-of-distribution (OOD) data, recent domain generalization methods aim to learn "stable" feature representations whose effect on the output remains invariant across domains. Given the theoretical connection between generalization and privacy, we ask whether better OOD generalization leads to better privacy for machine learning models, where privacy is measured through robustness to membership inference (MI) attacks. In general, we find that the relationship does not hold. Through extensive evaluation on a synthetic dataset and image datasets like MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and Chest X-rays, we show that a lower OOD generalization gap does not imply better robustness to MI attacks. Instead, privacy benefits are based on the extent to which a model captures the stable features. A model that captures stable features is more robust to MI attacks than models that exhibit better OOD generalization but do not learn stable features. Further, for the same provable differential privacy guarantees, a model that learns stable features provides higher utility as compared to others. Our results offer the first extensive empirical study connecting stable features and privacy, and also have a takeaway for the domain generalization community; MI attack can be used as a complementary metric to measure model quality.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2110.03369")
get_code_for_paper("2110.03369")
have("2110.03369")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2110.03369.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2110.03369)
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