Sanghyun Hong, Tudor Dumitras, Michael Panaitescu, Yigitcan Kaya
10 of 12 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (10 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 10 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-21; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2110.13541.json · badge: /api/ran/2110.13541.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation | alias (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
10 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| AsymmetricQuantizer | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9a335d5e444ef7f6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, AsymmetricQuantizer: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| MovingAverageRangeTracker | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("48c45d01e5c1b780") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, MovingAverageRangeTracker: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| QuantizedConv2d | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b37124bb0e393e91") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, QuantizedConv2d: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| QuantizedLinear | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d8db79419e17e540") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, QuantizedLinear: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| Quantizer | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d70c915efcf4d1a4") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, Quantizer: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| RangeTracker | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("04d0d5fd405c1f27") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, RangeTracker: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| Round | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9c001f882200270e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, Round: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| SignedQuantizer | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("016074abfad976a6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, SignedQuantizer: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| SymmetricQuantizer | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8a74c2894fe32bb3") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, SymmetricQuantizer: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| UnsignedQuantizer | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("cc8c55399eb7d028") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, UnsignedQuantizer: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| QuantizationEnabler | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("19b7026f240ed406") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| train_w_perturb | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
secure-ai-systems-group/qu-anti-zation/attack_w_lossfn.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8cff3673daceae2c") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 12 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 12 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 12 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 12 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-21.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Quantization is a popular technique that transforms the parameter representation of a neural network from floating-point numbers into lower-precision ones (e.g., 8-bit integers). It reduces the memory footprint and the computational cost at inference, facilitating the deployment of resource-hungry models. However, the parameter perturbations caused by this transformation result in behavioral disparities between the model before and after quantization. For example, a quantized model can misclassify some test-time samples that are otherwise classified correctly. It is not known whether such differences lead to a new security vulnerability. We hypothesize that an adversary may control this disparity to introduce specific behaviors that activate upon quantization. To study this hypothesis, we weaponize quantizationaware training and propose a new training framework to implement adversarial quantization outcomes. Following this framework, we present three attacks we carry out with quantization: (i) an indiscriminate attack for significant accuracy loss; (ii) a targeted attack against specific samples; and (iii) a backdoor attack for controlling the model with an input trigger. We further show that a single compromised model defeats multiple quantization schemes, including robust quantization techniques. Moreover, in a federated learning scenario, we demonstrate that a set of malicious participants who conspire can inject our quantization-activated backdoor. Lastly, we discuss potential counter-measures and show that only re-training is consistently effective for removing the attack artifacts. Our code is available at
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2110.13541")
get_code_for_paper("2110.13541")
have("2110.13541")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2110.13541.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2110.13541)
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