SYNTOLOGY HomeExplorerAtlasCodeMethodologyAboutDevelopersFeedPricing
Paper · 2201.04845 · 2022

Reconstructing Training Data with Informed Adversaries

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

We have not lifted any functions out of this paper's repositories yet, so there is nothing we have run. The repositories linked to it are listed below.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Given access to a machine learning model, can an adversary reconstruct the model's training data? This work studies this question from the lens of a powerful informed adversary who knows all the training data points except one. By instantiating concrete attacks, we show it is feasible to reconstruct the remaining data point in this stringent threat model. For convex models (e.g. logistic regression), reconstruction attacks are simple and can be derived in closed-form. For more general models (e.g. neural networks), we propose an attack strategy based on training a reconstructor network that receives as input the weights of the model under attack and produces as output the target data point. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on image classifiers trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10, and systematically investigate which factors of standard machine learning pipelines affect reconstruction success. Finally, we theoretically investigate what amount of differential privacy suffices to mitigate reconstruction attacks by informed adversaries. Our work provides an effective reconstruction attack that model developers can use to assess memorization of individual points in general settings beyond those considered in previous works (e.g. generative language models or access to training gradients); it shows that standard models have the capacity to store enough information to enable high-fidelity reconstruction of training data points; and it demonstrates that differential privacy can successfully mitigate such attacks in a parameter regime where utility degradation is minimal.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

get_harvested_code_for_paper("2201.04845")
get_code_for_paper("2201.04845")
have("2201.04845")

The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:

curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2201.04845.json

A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):

[![Syntology run record](https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2201.04845.svg)](https://syntology.ai/paper/2201.04845)

Connect an agent — have() is free.