Yiming Li, Baoyuan Wu, Kui Ren, Kunzhe Huang, Zhan Qin
1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (1 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 1 has no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2202.03423.json · badge: /api/ran/2202.03423.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| sclbd/dbd | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| SimCLRLoss | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
sclbd/dbd/model/loss.py pointer only (licence: GPL-3.0) · get_code("14db96cba710a88d") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GPL-3.0, as GitHub detects it on this paper's repository, sclbd/dbd, is not in the permissive set Syntology serves inline. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Recent studies have revealed that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers embed hidden backdoors in the DNN model by poisoning a few training samples. The attacked model behaves normally on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be maliciously changed when the backdoor is activated. We reveal that poisoned samples tend to cluster together in the feature space of the attacked DNN model, which is mostly due to the endto-end supervised training paradigm. Inspired by this observation, we propose a novel backdoor defense via decoupling the original end-to-end training process into three stages. Specifically, we first learn the backbone of a DNN model via self-supervised learning based on training samples without their labels. The learned backbone will map samples with the same ground-truth label to similar locations in the feature space. Then, we freeze the parameters of the learned backbone and train the remaining fully connected layers via standard training with all (labeled) training samples. Lastly, to further alleviate side-effects of poisoned samples in the second stage, we remove labels of some 'low-credible' samples determined based on the learned model and conduct a semi-supervised fine-tuning of the whole model. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets and DNN models verify that the proposed defense is effective in reducing backdoor threats while preserving high accuracy in predicting benign samples. Our code is available at https://github.com/SCLBD/DBD.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2202.03423")
get_code_for_paper("2202.03423")
have("2202.03423")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2202.03423.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2202.03423)
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