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Paper · 2205.13176 · 2022

On Collective Robustness of Bagging Against Data Poisoning

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

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Abstract

Bootstrap aggregating (bagging) is an effective ensemble protocol, which is believed can enhance robustness by its majority voting mechanism. Recent works further prove the sample-wise robustness certificates for certain forms of bagging (e.g. partition aggregation). Beyond these particular forms, in this paper, \emph{we propose the first collective certification for general bagging to compute the tight robustness against the global poisoning attack}. Specifically, we compute the maximum number of simultaneously changed predictions via solving a binary integer linear programming (BILP) problem. Then we analyze the robustness of vanilla bagging and give the upper bound of the tolerable poison budget. Based on this analysis, \emph{we propose hash bagging} to improve the robustness of vanilla bagging almost for free. This is achieved by modifying the random subsampling in vanilla bagging to a hash-based deterministic subsampling, as a way of controlling the influence scope for each poisoning sample universally. Our extensive experiments show the notable advantage in terms of applicability and robustness.

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