Pin-Yu Chen, Yun-Yun Tsai, Tsung-Yi Ho, Lei Hsiung
6 of 8 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 6 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2207.07797.json · badge: /api/ran/2207.07797.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| IBM/composite-adv | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
6 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| eval_test | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/composite-adv/train_cifar10.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2ff09dbc55d1c1a2") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| list_type | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/composite-adv/evaluate_model.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("fffa95de3f8df799") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| list_type | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/composite-adv/train_imagenet.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("796140347cb0999f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| make_madry_model | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/composite-adv/composite_adv/utilities.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a9a4dc0fe0402eef") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned MinimalModel. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| make_model | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/composite-adv/composite_adv/utilities.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a910d37c1ce20592") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ModelWrapper. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| validate | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/composite-adv/train_imagenet.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2417ff185fb94b05") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| make_dataloader | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/composite-adv/composite_adv/utilities.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("fb0186900a11e115") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| train_ep | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/composite-adv/train_imagenet.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0b57f21bdaa164ad") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 8 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 8 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 8 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 8 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Prior literature on adversarial attack methods has mainly focused on attacking with and defending against a single threat model, e.g., perturbations bounded in Lp ball. However, multiple threat models can be combined into composite perturbations. One such approach, composite adversarial attack (CAA), not only expands the perturbable space of the image, but also may be overlooked by current modes of robustness evaluation. This paper demonstrates how CAA's attack order affects the resulting image, and provides real-time inferences of different models, which will facilitate users' configuration of the parameters of the attack level and their rapid evaluation of model prediction. A leaderboard to benchmark adversarial robustness against CAA is also introduced. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have transformed computer vision and have been used in many fields, including aviation, climate forecasting, and medicine, among others. However, when a DNN encounters carefully crafted images, it can exhibit various vulnerabilities: for instance, lack of robustness in the face of adversarial attack [Szegedy et al., 2013]. By utilizing adversarial attacks to optimize perturbations, one can intentionally derive a perturbed sample from a normal image, and make it imperceptible to human beings. In other words, despite the original and adversarial images looking very much alike to us, the latter can lead well-trained DNN models to make wrong predictions. Previous studies have sought to create bounded perturbations in a metric manner [Goodfellow et al., 2015;Chen et al., 2018]. Most such work has focused on ℓ p -norm perturbation (i.e., ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , and ℓ ∞ ) and utilized gradient-based optimization -i.e., fast gradient sign method (FGSM), projected gradient descent (PGD), or C&W -to effectively generate the adversarial example. However, it is possible to extend adversarial perturbations beyond the ℓ p -norm bounds. For instance, Laidlaw et al. generated their perturbation in a perceptual distance metric [Laidlaw et al., 2021], and Hosseini and * Contact Author 1. Models and Images Selection 2. Craft Composite Perturbation (Real-time Rendering) 3. Real-time Model Inference 1. Adjustable Perturbation Blocks 2. Order Effect & Model Inference Visualization CARBEN
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2207.07797")
get_code_for_paper("2207.07797")
have("2207.07797")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2207.07797.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2207.07797)
Connect an agent — have() is free.