8 of 10 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 6 have no contract verdict; 2 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-21; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2211.08044.json · badge: /api/ran/2211.08044.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| ndraeger/waba | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
8 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| alexnet | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ndraeger/waba/classification/models/networks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f94761b672278106") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned AlexNet. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| center_crop | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ndraeger/waba/segmentation/models/networks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0be7b9d5432241aa") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 4, 6, 5) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| conv1x1 | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ndraeger/waba/classification/models/networks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("50efec97e3cc12bc") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Conv2d. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| conv3x3 | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ndraeger/waba/classification/models/networks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7e98e1d315e2ea27") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Conv2d. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| eval_image | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ndraeger/waba/segmentation/utils/tools.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("98aaaeb5c0255d77") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| index2bgr_v | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ndraeger/waba/segmentation/utils/tools.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d5e5836458e8af6a") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 3, dtype family int, shape (3, 3, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| index2bgr_z | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ndraeger/waba/segmentation/utils/tools.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7a1c4d9e38294c4f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 3, dtype family int, shape (3, 4, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| up_pad | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
ndraeger/waba/segmentation/models/networks.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f02db96cd0e921d3") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 4, 7, 9) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_seg_network | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ndraeger/waba/segmentation/models/network_factory.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a150ac652f5f6bba") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_upsampling_weight | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ndraeger/waba/segmentation/models/networks.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from jiwei0921/CoNet, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("68f02849ad3eb678") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from jiwei0921/CoNet, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 10 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 10 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 10 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (3 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 2 later) and 7 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| conv1x1 | 112 other papers 32 dated earlier, 79 later, 1 same year, order not determinable · 6 only as an assembly brick |
1512.03385 (2015-12) Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition |
1806.01531 (2018-06) Deep Mixture of Experts via Shallow Embedding 1905.12794 (2019-05) Fashion IQ: A New Dataset Towards Retrieving Images by Natural Language Feedback and 109 more not named here |
| conv3x3 | 111 other papers 33 dated earlier, 77 later, 1 same year, order not determinable · 6 only as an assembly brick |
1512.03385 (2015-12) Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition |
1806.01531 (2018-06) Deep Mixture of Experts via Shallow Embedding 1905.12794 (2019-05) Fashion IQ: A New Dataset Towards Retrieving Images by Natural Language Feedback and 108 more not named here |
| get_upsampling_weight | 9 other papers 9 dated earlier |
1807.09856 (2018-07) Where are the Blobs: Counting by Localization with Point Supervision |
1809.00338 (2018-09) Look Across Elapse: Disentangled Representation Learning and Photorealistic Cross-Age Face Synthesis for Age-Invariant Face Recognition 2006.00176 (2020-06) When2com: Multi-Agent Perception via Communication Graph Grouping and 6 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-21.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Recent years have witnessed the great success of deep learning algorithms in the geoscience and remote sensing realm. Nevertheless, the security and robustness of deep learning models deserve special attention when addressing safety-critical remote sensing tasks. In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of backdoor attacks for remote sensing data, where both scene classification and semantic segmentation tasks are considered. While most of the existing backdoor attack algorithms rely on visible triggers like squared patches with well-designed patterns, we propose a novel wavelet transform-based attack (WABA) method, which can achieve invisible attacks by injecting the trigger image into the poisoned image in the low-frequency domain. In this way, the high-frequency information in the trigger image can be filtered out in the attack, resulting in stealthy data poisoning. Despite its simplicity, the proposed method can significantly cheat the current state-of-the-art deep learning models with a high attack success rate. We further analyze how different trigger images and the hyper-parameters in the wavelet transform would influence the performance of the proposed method. Extensive experiments on four benchmark remote sensing datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method for both scene classification and semantic segmentation tasks and thus highlight the importance of designing advanced backdoor defense algorithms to address this threat in remote sensing scenarios. The code will be available online at \url{https://github.com/ndraeger/waba}.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2211.08044")
get_code_for_paper("2211.08044")
have("2211.08044")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2211.08044.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2211.08044)
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