1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2304.04512.json · badge: /api/ran/2304.04512.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| azuma164/defense-prefix | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| pretify_classname | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
azuma164/defense-prefix/datasets/eurosat.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from mlfoundations/task_vectors, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("241a2a00ba0c307b") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from mlfoundations/task_vectors, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| pretify_classname | 5 other papers 5 later |
2405.07813 (2024-05) Localizing Task Information for Improved Model Merging and Compression |
2410.17146 (2024-10) LiNeS: Post-training Layer Scaling Prevents Forgetting and Enhances Model Merging 2412.12153 (2024-12) Revisiting Weight Averaging for Model Merging and 2 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Vision-language pre-training models (VLPs) have exhibited revolutionary improvements in various vision-language tasks. In VLP, some adversarial attacks fool a model into false or absurd classifications. Previous studies addressed these attacks by fine-tuning the model or changing its architecture. However, these methods risk losing the original model's performance and are difficult to apply to downstream tasks. In particular, their applicability to other tasks has not been considered. In this study, we addressed the reduction of the impact of typographic attacks on CLIP without changing the model parameters. To achieve this, we expand the idea of "prefix learning" and introduce our simple yet effective method: Defense-Prefix (DP), which inserts the DP token before a class name to make words "robust" against typographic attacks. Our method can be easily applied to downstream tasks, such as object detection, because the proposed method is independent of the model parameters. Our method significantly improves the accuracy of classification tasks for typographic attack datasets, while maintaining the zero-shot capabilities of the model. In addition, we leverage our proposed method for object detection, demonstrating its high applicability and effectiveness. The codes and datasets are available at https://github.com/azuma164/Defense-Prefix.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2304.04512")
get_code_for_paper("2304.04512")
have("2304.04512")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2304.04512.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2304.04512)
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