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Paper · 2306.05093 · 2023

Investigating the Effect of Misalignment on Membership Privacy in the White-box Setting

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2306.05093.json · badge: /api/ran/2306.05093.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
microsoft/shadow-realignment-mia canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
1 ran · 0 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
evaluate_model Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
microsoft/shadow-realignment-mia/train_controlled_randomness.py
code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3528a0b4188e1ed8")
How it ran

Ran in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.

import torch
import torch.nn as nn

torch.manual_seed(0)

# Build a minimal model that accepts inputs and outputs logits for 2 classes
class MinimalModel(nn.Module):
    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        self.linear = nn.Linear(4, 2)
    
    def forward(self, x):
        return self.linear(x)

# Create model instance
model = MinimalModel()

# Create a minimal dataloader (list of batches with (inputs, labels) tuples)
# Batch size 2, input dimension 4, binary classification (labels 0 or 1)
dataloader = [
    (torch.randn(2, 4), torch.tensor([0, 1])),
    (torch.randn(2, 4), torch.tensor([1, 0])),
]

# Set device to CPU
device = 'cpu'

# Construct the ARGS dictionary
ARGS = {
    'model': model,
    'dataloader': dataloader,
    'device': device,
    'compute_auc': True,
}
Setup block drafted by
a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API
Imports
sklearn, torch, tqdm — import names as written, not package names to install; a name the repository itself provides is not a package
Returned
type tuple — a tuple output has no array shape of its own; none is stated
Environment
image not recorded; re-verify against syntology-harvest-sandbox:v5-deps; not recorded for this sample: the harness installs a cuda-to-cpu shim (cuda_shim.py) before every sample and no run records whether a sample needed it; seed: none by the harness; any seed is in the setup block

Also present in other papers' code

Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Machine learning models have been shown to leak sensitive information about their training datasets. Models are increasingly deployed on devices, raising concerns that white-box access to the model parameters increases the attack surface compared to black-box access which only provides query access. Directly extending the shadow modelling technique from the black-box to the white-box setting has been shown, in general, not to perform better than black-box only attacks. A potential reason is misalignment, a known characteristic of deep neural networks. In the shadow modelling context, misalignment means that, while the shadow models learn similar features in each layer, the features are located in different positions. We here present the first systematic analysis of the causes of misalignment in shadow models and show the use of a different weight initialisation to be the main cause. We then extend several re-alignment techniques, previously developed in the model fusion literature, to the shadow modelling context, where the goal is to re-align the layers of a shadow model to those of the target model. We show re-alignment techniques to significantly reduce the measured misalignment between the target and shadow models. Finally, we perform a comprehensive evaluation of white-box membership inference attacks (MIA). Our analysis reveals that internal layer activation-based MIAs suffer strongly from shadow model misalignment, while gradient-based MIAs are only sometimes significantly affected. We show that re-aligning the shadow models strongly improves the former's performance and can also improve the latter's performance, although less frequently. Taken together, our results highlight that on-device deployment increases the attack surface and that the newly available information can be used to build more powerful attacks.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

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get_code_for_paper("2306.05093")
have("2306.05093")

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