1 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2312.08207.json · badge: /api/ran/2312.08207.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| py85252876/reconstruction-based-attack | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| sc | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
py85252876/reconstruction-based-attack/build_caption.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from mail-research/cad-attribution4diffusion, is pointer only (licence: GPL-3.0) · get_code("02fe1aebf8355cab") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from mail-research/cad-attribution4diffusion, and GPL-3.0, as GitHub detects it on that repository, is not in the permissive set Syntology serves inline. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| compute_scores | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
py85252876/reconstruction-based-attack/cal_embedding.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("fde82a812f2452e8") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| sc | 4 other papers 2 dated earlier, 2 later · 1 only as an assembly brick |
2306.11695 (2023-06) A Simple and Effective Pruning Approach for Large Language Models |
2310.10012 (2023-10) Ring-A-Bell! How Reliable are Concept Removal Methods for Diffusion Models? 2412.02542 (2024-12) Unveiling Concept Attribution in Diffusion Models and 1 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
With the rapid advancement of diffusion-based image-generative models, the quality of generated images has become increasingly photorealistic. Moreover, with the release of high-quality pre-trained image-generative models, a growing number of users are downloading these pre-trained models to fine-tune them with downstream datasets for various image-generation tasks. However, employing such powerful pre-trained models in downstream tasks presents significant privacy leakage risks. In this paper, we propose the first reconstruction-based membership inference attack framework, tailored for recent diffusion models, and in the more stringent black-box access setting. Considering four distinct attack scenarios and three types of attacks, this framework is capable of targeting any popular conditional generator model, achieving high precision, evidenced by an impressive AUC of $0.95$.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2312.08207")
get_code_for_paper("2312.08207")
have("2312.08207")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2312.08207.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2312.08207)
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