1 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2312.14895.json · badge: /api/ran/2312.14895.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| Subhodip123/weak-unlearning-gan | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| make_kernel | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
Subhodip123/weak-unlearning-gan/utils/stylegan2/model.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from dkn16/multi-fidel-gan-21cm, is pointer only (licence: NOASSERTION) · get_code("6f65e378a4313f87") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from dkn16/multi-fidel-gan-21cm, and GitHub could not classify the licence of that repository (NOASSERTION). The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| augment_tensorization | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Subhodip123/weak-unlearning-gan/baseclassifier/celebahq/augment.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("4680816e0b421fed") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| make_kernel | 40 other papers 38 dated earlier, 2 later · 10 only as an assembly brick |
1812.04948 (2018-12) A Style-Based Generator Architecture for Generative Adversarial Networks |
1912.04958 (2019-12) Analyzing and Improving the Image Quality of StyleGAN 2007.06600 (2020-07) Closed-Form Factorization of Latent Semantics in GANs and 37 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
The heightened emphasis on the regulation of deep generative models, propelled by escalating concerns pertaining to privacy and compliance with regulatory frameworks, underscores the imperative need for precise control mechanisms over these models. This urgency is particularly underscored by instances in which generative models generate outputs that encompass objectionable, offensive, or potentially injurious content. In response, machine unlearning has emerged to selectively forget specific knowledge or remove the influence of undesirable data subsets from pre-trained models. However, modern machine unlearning approaches typically assume access to model parameters and architectural details during unlearning, which is not always feasible. In multitude of downstream tasks, these models function as black-box systems, with inaccessible pre-trained parameters, architectures, and training data. In such scenarios, the possibility of filtering undesired outputs becomes a practical alternative. The primary goal of this study is twofold: first, to elucidate the relationship between filtering and unlearning processes, and second, to formulate a methodology aimed at mitigating the display of undesirable outputs generated from models characterized as black-box systems. Theoretical analysis in this study demonstrates that, in the context of black-box models, filtering can be seen as a form of weak unlearning. Our proposed \textbf{\textit{Feature Aware Similarity Thresholding(FAST)}} method effectively suppresses undesired outputs by systematically encoding the representation of unwanted features in the latent space.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2312.14895")
get_code_for_paper("2312.14895")
have("2312.14895")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2312.14895.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2312.14895)
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