Wanli Ouyang, Yu Qiao, Jie Liu, Chao Yang, Jiaheng Liu, Zhanhui Zhou, Zhichen Dong
None of the 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories has a recorded run on a synthesized input (1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2402.12343.json · badge: /api/ran/2402.12343.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| ZHZisZZ/emulated-disalignment | marked official in Papers with Code Papers with Code archive |
0 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| EFTPosthocGenerationMixin | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ZHZisZZ/emulated-disalignment/src/inference_time_alignment/decoder.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("fdabc94c28726f1d") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, ZHZisZZ/emulated-disalignment when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Large language models (LLMs) undergo safety alignment to ensure safe conversations with humans. However, this paper introduces a training-free attack method capable of reversing safety alignment, converting the outcomes of stronger alignment into greater potential for harm by accessing only LLM output token distributions. Specifically, our method achieves this reversal by contrasting the output token distribution of a safety-aligned language model (e.g., Llama-2-chat) against its pre-trained version (e.g., Llama-2), so that the token predictions are shifted towards the opposite direction of safety alignment. We name this method emulated disalignment (ED) because sampling from this contrastive distribution provably emulates the result of fine-tuning to minimize a safety reward. Our experiments with ED across three evaluation datasets and four model families (Llama-1, Llama-2, Mistral, and Alpaca) show that ED doubles the harmfulness of pretrained models and outperforms strong baselines, achieving the highest harmful rates in 43 out of 48 evaluation subsets by a large margin. Eventually, given ED's reliance on language model output token distributions, which particularly compromises open-source models, our findings highlight the need to reassess the open accessibility of language models, even if they have been safety-aligned. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHZisZZ/ emulated-disalignment.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2402.12343")
get_code_for_paper("2402.12343")
have("2402.12343")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2402.12343.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2402.12343)
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