1 of 6 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 5 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2403.01251.json · badge: /api/ran/2403.01251.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| zhaoyiran924/probe-sampling | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
0 ran · 5 no recorded run |
| grayswanai/nanogcg | reimplementation (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| sample_ids_from_grad | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
grayswanai/nanogcg/nanogcg/gcg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("56640da5aa960a42") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Tensor, ndim 2, dtype family int, shape (3, 5) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_embedding_layer | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
zhaoyiran924/probe-sampling/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("16d7b655a5002ab4") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_embedding_matrix | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
zhaoyiran924/probe-sampling/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("4c1661dc05e88ceb") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_embeddings | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
zhaoyiran924/probe-sampling/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("db2b1708ea3c49ed") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_filtered_cands | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
zhaoyiran924/probe-sampling/llm_attacks/minimal_gcg/opt_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("25ae440509f39ec5") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| sample_control | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
zhaoyiran924/probe-sampling/llm_attacks/minimal_gcg/opt_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("94d7ddaf0169dbf1") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 6 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 6 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 6 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (2 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 2 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| sample_control | 6 other papers 2 dated earlier, 4 later |
2311.09948 (2023-11) Hijacking Large Language Models via Adversarial In-Context Learning |
2402.13459 (2024-02) Learning to Poison Large Language Models for Downstream Manipulation 2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck and 3 more not named here |
| get_filtered_cands | 4 other papers 4 later |
2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck |
2405.01229 (2024-05) Boosting Jailbreak Attack with Momentum 2406.01288 (2024-06) Improved Few-Shot Jailbreaking Can Circumvent Aligned Language Models and Their Defenses and 1 more not named here |
| sample_ids_from_grad | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
2307.15043 (2023-07) Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) has become a critical issue given their rapid progresses. Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) is shown to be effective in constructing adversarial prompts to break the aligned LLMs, but optimization of GCG is time-consuming. To reduce the time cost of GCG and enable more comprehensive studies of LLM safety, in this work, we study a new algorithm called $\texttt{Probe sampling}$. At the core of the algorithm is a mechanism that dynamically determines how similar a smaller draft model's predictions are to the target model's predictions for prompt candidates. When the target model is similar to the draft model, we rely heavily on the draft model to filter out a large number of potential prompt candidates. Probe sampling achieves up to $5.6$ times speedup using Llama2-7b-chat and leads to equal or improved attack success rate (ASR) on the AdvBench. Furthermore, probe sampling is also able to accelerate other prompt optimization techniques and adversarial methods, leading to acceleration of $1.8\times$ for AutoPrompt, $2.4\times$ for APE and $2.4\times$ for AutoDAN.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2403.01251")
get_code_for_paper("2403.01251")
have("2403.01251")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2403.01251.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2403.01251)
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