2 of 4 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 2 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2403.09751.json · badge: /api/ran/2403.09751.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| royweiss1/GPT_Keylogger | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
2 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| make_input | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
royweiss1/GPT_Keylogger/archive/fine_tune_T5_first.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("06b70c44d7d79671") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| make_input | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
royweiss1/GPT_Keylogger/archive/fine_tune_T5_with_context.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7572fe54650b47e4") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| apply_token | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
royweiss1/GPT_Keylogger/archive/fine_tune_T5_first.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7440f0a84d98629e") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| encoding_lengths | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
royweiss1/GPT_Keylogger/archive/fine_tune_T5_first.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e4e573d7601e989a") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 4 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 4 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 4 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 4 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
AI assistants are becoming an integral part of society, used for asking advice or help in personal and confidential issues. In this paper, we unveil a novel side-channel that can be used to read encrypted responses from AI Assistants over the web: the token-length side-channel. We found that many vendors, including OpenAI and Microsoft, have this side-channel. However, inferring the content of a response from a token-length sequence alone proves challenging. This is because tokens are akin to words, and responses can be several sentences long leading to millions of grammatically correct sentences. In this paper, we show how this can be overcome by (1) utilizing the power of a large language model (LLM) to translate these sequences, (2) providing the LLM with inter-sentence context to narrow the search space and (3) performing a known-plaintext attack by fine-tuning the model on the target model's writing style. Using these methods, we were able to accurately reconstruct 29\% of an AI assistant's responses and successfully infer the topic from 55\% of them. To demonstrate the threat, we performed the attack on OpenAI's ChatGPT-4 and Microsoft's Copilot on both browser and API traffic.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2403.09751")
get_code_for_paper("2403.09751")
have("2403.09751")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2403.09751.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2403.09751)
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