Florian Tramèr, Vikash Sehwag, Francesco Croce, Edgar Dobriban, Maksym Andriushchenko, Nicolas Flammarion, Edoardo Debenedetti, George Pappas, Hamed Hassani, Eric Wong, Alexander Robey, Patrick Chao
1 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2404.01318.json · badge: /api/ran/2404.01318.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| JailbreakBench/jailbreakbench | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| parse_model_name_attack_type | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
JailbreakBench/jailbreakbench/src/jailbreakbench/config.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f7f27e7af790f826") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| read_dataset | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
JailbreakBench/jailbreakbench/src/jailbreakbench/dataset.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("77085141bbef10a9") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Jailbreak attacks cause large language models (LLMs) to generate harmful, unethical, or otherwise objectionable content. Evaluating these attacks presents a number of challenges, which the current collection of benchmarks and evaluation techniques do not adequately address. First, there is no clear standard of practice regarding jailbreaking evaluation. Second, existing works compute costs and success rates in incomparable ways. And third, numerous works are not reproducible, as they withhold adversarial prompts, involve closed-source code, or rely on evolving proprietary APIs. To address these challenges, we introduce JailbreakBench, an open-sourced benchmark with the following components: (1) an evolving repository of state-of-the-art adversarial prompts, which we refer to as jailbreak artifacts; (2) a jailbreaking dataset comprising 100 behaviorsboth original and sourced from prior work (Zou et al., 2023;Mazeika et al., 2023Mazeika et al., , 2024)-which align with OpenAI's usage policies; (3) a standardized evaluation framework at https://github.com/JailbreakBench/jailbreakbench that includes a clearly defined threat model, system prompts, chat templates, and scoring functions; and (4) a leaderboard at https://jailbreakbench.github.io/ that tracks the performance of attacks and defenses for various LLMs. We have carefully considered the potential ethical implications of releasing this benchmark, and believe that it will be a net positive for the community.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2404.01318")
get_code_for_paper("2404.01318")
have("2404.01318")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2404.01318.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2404.01318)
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