4 of 5 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2404.02406.json · badge: /api/ran/2404.02406.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| hychaochao/chat-models-backdoor-attacking | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
4 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| encode_prompt | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
hychaochao/chat-models-backdoor-attacking/Instructional_Model_Backdoor/generate_instruction.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9b2dd0265fc6e6b6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| find_word_in_string | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
hychaochao/chat-models-backdoor-attacking/Instructional_Model_Backdoor/generate_instruction.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8ca6a5f9f77053c2") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Match. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| jload | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
hychaochao/chat-models-backdoor-attacking/Instructional_Model_Backdoor/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d07d04439cd1d44f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| post_process_gpt3_response | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
hychaochao/chat-models-backdoor-attacking/Instructional_Model_Backdoor/generate_instruction.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a5e4ad4e11cf2143") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_conv_template | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
hychaochao/chat-models-backdoor-attacking/fastchat/conversation.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8ba434c7007f1b4a") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 5 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 5 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 5 distinct functions with an identity, 5 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (5 with at least one paper dated earlier, 1 the same month, 5 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| get_conv_template | 69 other papers 24 dated earlier, 1 the same month, 39 later, 4 same year, order not determinable, 1 undated |
1911.03705 (2019-11) CommonGen: A Constrained Text Generation Challenge for Generative Commonsense Reasoning |
2112.05682 (2021-12) Self-attention Does Not Need $O(n^2)$ Memory 2204.07705 (2022-04) SUPER-NATURALINSTRUCTIONS: Generalization via Declarative Instructions on 1600+ NLP Tasks and 66 more not named here |
| jload | 46 other papers 23 dated earlier, 20 later, 3 same year, order not determinable |
2302.13971 (2023-02) LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models |
2305.12870 (2023-05) Lion: Adversarial Distillation of Proprietary Large Language Models 2305.13068 (2023-05) Making Language Models Better Tool Learners with Execution Feedback and 43 more not named here |
| find_word_in_string | 11 other papers 8 dated earlier, 3 later |
2212.10560 (2022-12) SELF-INSTRUCT: Aligning Language Models with Self-Generated Instructions |
2023.findings-emnlp.836 (2023 (year only)) Ensemble-Instruct: Generating Instruction-Tuning Data with a Heterogeneous Mixture of LMs 2302.13971 (2023-02) LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models and 8 more not named here |
| encode_prompt | 7 other papers 4 dated earlier, 3 later |
2302.13971 (2023-02) LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models |
2305.14825 (2023-05) Large Language Models are In-Context Semantic Reasoners rather than Symbolic Reasoners 2308.04948 (2023-08) Extrapolating Large Language Models to Non-English by Aligning Languages and 4 more not named here |
| post_process_gpt3_response | 7 other papers 4 dated earlier, 3 later |
2302.13971 (2023-02) LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models |
2305.14825 (2023-05) Large Language Models are In-Context Semantic Reasoners rather than Symbolic Reasoners 2308.04948 (2023-08) Extrapolating Large Language Models to Non-English by Aligning Languages and 4 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Recent researches have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to a security threat known as Backdoor Attack. The backdoored model will behave well in normal cases but exhibit malicious behaviours on inputs inserted with a specific backdoor trigger. Current backdoor studies on LLMs predominantly focus on instruction-tuned LLMs, while neglecting another realistic scenario where LLMs are fine-tuned on multi-turn conversational data to be chat models. Chat models are extensively adopted across various real-world scenarios, thus the security of chat models deserves increasing attention. Unfortunately, we point out that the flexible multi-turn interaction format instead increases the flexibility of trigger designs and amplifies the vulnerability of chat models to backdoor attacks. In this work, we reveal and achieve a novel backdoor attacking method on chat models by distributing multiple trigger scenarios across user inputs in different rounds, and making the backdoor be triggered only when all trigger scenarios have appeared in the historical conversations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can achieve high attack success rates (e.g., over 90% ASR on Vicuna-7B) while successfully maintaining the normal capabilities of chat models on providing helpful responses to benign user requests. Also, the backdoor can not be easily removed by the downstream re-alignment, highlighting the importance of continued research and attention to the security concerns of chat models. Warning: This paper may contain toxic content.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2404.02406")
get_code_for_paper("2404.02406")
have("2404.02406")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2404.02406.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2404.02406)
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