2 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2406.04031.json · badge: /api/ran/2406.04031.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| NY1024/BAP-Jailbreak-Vision-Language-Models-via-Bi-Modal-Adversarial-Prompt | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
2 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| disabled_train | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
NY1024/BAP-Jailbreak-Vision-Language-Models-via-Bi-Modal-Adversarial-Prompt/MiniGPT-4/models/base_model.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("4cb732f513d69dfd") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, NY1024/BAP-Jailbreak-Vision-Language-Models-via-Bi-Modal-Adversarial-Prompt when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| tile | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
NY1024/BAP-Jailbreak-Vision-Language-Models-via-Bi-Modal-Adversarial-Prompt/LAVIS/lavis/models/base_model.py pointer only (licence: NONE); the stored copy get_code serves, from MengzhouLu/RetroMPA, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("cb33571427334815") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, NY1024/BAP-Jailbreak-Vision-Language-Models-via-Bi-Modal-Adversarial-Prompt when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| all_gather_with_grad | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
NY1024/BAP-Jailbreak-Vision-Language-Models-via-Bi-Modal-Adversarial-Prompt/LAVIS/lavis/models/base_model.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("0ec9fc2025c16f65") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, NY1024/BAP-Jailbreak-Vision-Language-Models-via-Bi-Modal-Adversarial-Prompt when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (3 with at least one paper dated earlier, 3 the same month, 3 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| disabled_train | 173 other papers 117 dated earlier, 9 the same month, 39 later, 8 same year, order not determinable · 5 only as an assembly brick |
2012.09841 (2020-12) Taming Transformers for High-Resolution Image Synthesis |
2102.05379 (2021-02) Argmax Flows and Multinomial Diffusion: Learning Categorical Distributions 2104.07652 (2021-04) Geometry-Free View Synthesis: Transformers and no 3D Priors and 170 more not named here |
| all_gather_with_grad | 91 other papers 64 dated earlier, 3 the same month, 20 later, 4 same year, order not determinable · 2 only as an assembly brick |
2206.02967 (2022-06) Masked Unsupervised Self-training for Label-free Image Classification |
2210.08773 (2022-10) Plug-and-Play VQA: Zero-shot VQA by Conjoining Large Pretrained Models with Zero Training 2302.06605 (2023-02) UniAdapter: Unified Parameter-Efficient Transfer Learning for Cross-modal Modeling and 88 more not named here |
| tile | 84 other papers 62 dated earlier, 3 the same month, 14 later, 5 same year, order not determinable |
2206.07699 (2022-06) Write and Paint: Generative Vision-Language Models are Unified Modal Learners |
2210.07795 (2022-10) EfficientVLM: Fast and Accurate Vision-Language Models via Knowledge Distillation and Modal-adaptive Pruning 2210.08773 (2022-10) Plug-and-Play VQA: Zero-shot VQA by Conjoining Large Pretrained Models with Zero Training and 81 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
In the realm of large vision language models (LVLMs), jailbreak attacks serve as a red-teaming approach to bypass guardrails and uncover safety implications. Existing jailbreaks predominantly focus on the visual modality, perturbing solely visual inputs in the prompt for attacks. However, they fall short when confronted with aligned models that fuse visual and textual features simultaneously for generation. To address this limitation, this paper introduces the Bi-Modal Adversarial Prompt Attack (BAP), which executes jailbreaks by optimizing textual and visual prompts cohesively. Initially, we adversarially embed universally harmful perturbations in an image, guided by a few-shot query-agnostic corpus (e.g., affirmative prefixes and negative inhibitions). This process ensures that image prompt LVLMs to respond positively to any harmful queries. Subsequently, leveraging the adversarial image, we optimize textual prompts with specific harmful intent. In particular, we utilize a large language model to analyze jailbreak failures and employ chain-of-thought reasoning to refine textual prompts through a feedback-iteration manner. To validate the efficacy of our approach, we conducted extensive evaluations on various datasets and LVLMs, demonstrating that our method significantly outperforms other methods by large margins (+29.03% in attack success rate on average). Additionally, we showcase the potential of our attacks on black-box commercial LVLMs, such as Gemini and ChatGLM.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2406.04031")
get_code_for_paper("2406.04031")
have("2406.04031")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2406.04031.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2406.04031)
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