1 of 7 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 6 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2406.05946.json · badge: /api/ran/2406.05946.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 6 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| get_hex_phi | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment/finetuning_buckets/datasets/utils/get_eval_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("59a1bc33ea694cc1") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_alpaca_instruction | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment/finetuning_buckets/datasets/utils/get_finetuning_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("584880181ee52b40") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_hex_phi_backdoor | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment/finetuning_buckets/datasets/utils/get_eval_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b4c93e16c63c0cdd") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_hex_phi_with_refusal_prefix | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment/finetuning_buckets/datasets/utils/get_eval_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("322473e24c0ea7a3") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_model | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment/finetuning_buckets/models/get_model.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5ccba273e30aff64") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_pure_bad | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment/finetuning_buckets/datasets/utils/get_finetuning_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0fdbd70545579b0f") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_safety_augmentation_data | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
unispac/shallow-vs-deep-alignment/finetuning_buckets/datasets/utils/get_finetuning_data.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2c7c6fbe31bd60bc") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 7 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 7 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 7 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 7 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
The safety alignment of current Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable. Relatively simple attacks, or even benign fine-tuning, can jailbreak aligned models. We argue that many of these vulnerabilities are related to a shared underlying issue: safety alignment can take shortcuts, wherein the alignment adapts a model's generative distribution primarily over only its very first few output tokens. We refer to this issue as shallow safety alignment. In this paper, we present case studies to explain why shallow safety alignment can exist and provide evidence that current aligned LLMs are subject to this issue. We also show how these findings help explain multiple recently discovered vulnerabilities in LLMs, including the susceptibility to adversarial suffix attacks, prefilling attacks, decoding parameter attacks, and fine-tuning attacks. Importantly, we discuss how this consolidated notion of shallow safety alignment sheds light on promising research directions for mitigating these vulnerabilities. For instance, we show that deepening the safety alignment beyond just the first few tokens can often meaningfully improve robustness against some common exploits. Finally, we design a regularized finetuning objective that makes the safety alignment more persistent against fine-tuning attacks by constraining updates on initial tokens. Overall, we advocate that future safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2406.05946")
get_code_for_paper("2406.05946")
have("2406.05946")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2406.05946.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2406.05946)
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