Yang Zhang, Yue Zhou, Henry Peng Zou, Barbara Eugenio
1 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (1 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 1 has no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 1 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2407.00869.json · badge: /api/ran/2407.00869.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| Yue-LLM-Pit/FFA | marked official in Papers with Code Papers with Code archive |
1 ran · 1 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| FFA | Ran ran on a synthesized input · constructed an object; no result was computed |
Yue-LLM-Pit/FFA/jailbreak.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e3cd114d05c0a47c") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned an instance of its own class, FFA: the run constructed the object and did not call it, so no result was computed. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| openai_chat_fast_gen | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Yue-LLM-Pit/FFA/jailbreak.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5885c5210fcad322") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
We find that language models have difficulties generating fallacious and deceptive reasoning. When asked to generate deceptive outputs, language models tend to leak honest counterparts but believe them to be false. Exploiting this deficiency, we propose a jailbreak attack method that elicits an aligned language model for malicious output. Specifically, we query the model to generate a fallacious yet deceptively real procedure for the harmful behavior. Since a fallacious procedure is generally considered fake and thus harmless by LLMs, it helps bypass the safeguard mechanism. Yet the output is factually harmful since the LLM cannot fabricate fallacious solutions but proposes truthful ones. We evaluate our approach over five safetyaligned large language models, comparing four previous jailbreak methods, and show that our approach achieves competitive performance with more harmful outputs. We believe the findings could be extended beyond model safety, such as self-verification and hallucination.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2407.00869")
get_code_for_paper("2407.00869")
have("2407.00869")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2407.00869.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2407.00869)
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