3 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2407.04151.json · badge: /api/ran/2407.04151.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| terrytong-git/poisonshare | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
3 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| choose_token | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
terrytong-git/poisonshare/poisoning.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("52f92aa6412d582f") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, terrytong-git/poisonshare when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| generate_denial | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
terrytong-git/poisonshare/poisoning.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("9e0218dfb0acdbfa") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, terrytong-git/poisonshare when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| inject | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
terrytong-git/poisonshare/poisoning.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("27e2c44933ec86b8") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, terrytong-git/poisonshare when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Large language models (LLMs) have acquired the ability to handle longer context lengths and understand nuances in text, expanding their dialogue capabilities beyond a single utterance. A popular user-facing application of LLMs is the multi-turn chat setting. Though longer chat memory and better understanding may seemingly benefit users, our paper exposes a vulnerability that leverages the multi-turn feature and strong learning ability of LLMs to harm the end-user: the backdoor. We demonstrate that LLMs can capture the combinational backdoor representation. Only upon presentation of triggers together does the backdoor activate. We also verify empirically that this representation is invariant to the position of the trigger utterance. Subsequently, inserting a single extra token into two utterances of 5%of the data can cause over 99% Attack Success Rate (ASR). Our results with 3 triggers demonstrate that this framework is generalizable, compatible with any trigger in an adversary's toolbox in a plug-and-play manner. Defending the backdoor can be challenging in the chat setting because of the large input and output space. Our analysis indicates that the distributed backdoor exacerbates the current challenges by polynomially increasing the dimension of the attacked input space. Canonical textual defenses like ONION and BKI leverage auxiliary model forward passes over individual tokens, scaling exponentially with the input sequence length and struggling to maintain computational feasibility. To this end, we propose a decoding time defense - decayed contrastive decoding - that scales linearly with assistant response sequence length and reduces the backdoor to as low as 0.35%.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2407.04151")
get_code_for_paper("2407.04151")
have("2407.04151")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2407.04151.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2407.04151)
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